U.S. AIR FORCE

Project RAND

CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
September 14 to 19, 1947 - New York

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June 9, 1948

The RAND Corporation
SANTA MONICA • CALIFORNIA

PROJECT RAND

(USAF PROJECT MX-791)

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PREFACE

The Conference of Social Scientists reported here was the first step in the initiation of a RAND social science program directed toward furthering national security.

This report presents a verbatim record of the Conference of Social Scientists; it has been edited only to the extent necessary for conciseness and clarity. The participants in the Conference have had no opportunity to review the transcript of their oral, extemporaneous remarks. Although the report is being published by The RAND Corporation the conference was held while the Project was a part of the Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc. The report is being printed in this form because it is primarily for the participants and for use within RAND.

Although the Conference was unclassified and no classified material was discussed, the report has been classified "Restricted" to insure against public dissemination.

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SUMMARY

ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFERENCE

Consideration of the investigations required to carry out RAND's directive has resulted in an increasing awareness of the need for cooperation with experts in the human sciences. Such cooperation is necessary, not only for a more adequate treatment of the problems with which RAND is already concerned, but also to make it possible to enlarge the scope of these concerns to coincide with the broad subject of RAND's directive.

The initial step in this direction was the convening of a Conference of Social Scientists in New York City, from September 14 to 19, 1947. The major purposes of the Conference were two: first, to acquaint experts in these disciplines with RAND and its problems, and to invite their interest in further joint efforts; and second, to provide RAND with the results of deliberations from which it could judge the nature and extent of the contribution which the human sciences can make.

Both for reasons of security and to allow maximum scope to the inventiveness of the participants, the content of the discussions was not restricted by a delineation of the area directly and immediately appropriate to RAND's efforts. The Conference was therefore invited to discuss any research relevant to the broad topics of the identification, measurement, and control of factors important in (1) the occurrence of war, and (2) the winning of war if it should occur.

The specific material for the agenda consisted of research projects submitted by the participants prior to the Conference. These were summarized in a standard form (unfortunately often inadequate), and to them were added a few from RAND files and others contributed unofficially by interested Government agencies. Research projects were discussed without reference to source or authorship.

The Conference was divided into twelve panels, grouped, in the last two days, into five committees: Psychology and Sociology, Political Science, Economics, Intelligence and Military Affairs, and Research Methods, Organization, and Planning. The participants are listed on page xvii.

OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE

A verbatim record was kept of the Conference proceedings; it has been edited only to the extent necessary for conciseness and clarity.

Attainment of the first objective of the Conference — establishment of working relations with experts in the social sciences — can be fully appraised only as RAND activities in this area proceed. A number of the participants, however, are now serving as RAND consultants, and with their help expert personnel for the home staff is being procured. Discussions are also under way on subcontracting certain problems in the human sciences to universities and other social science research agencies.

The second objective, as summarized by Dr. Herbert Goldhamer at the closing plenary session of the Conference, was "to get RAND started on a social science program that would be useful to national security. Before this Conference got under way, RAND had been tentatively circling around a rather vast ocean and getting its toes wet, feeling what the temperature of the water was. This Conference has very effectively precipitated it into the midst of the waves...."

The following summaries are intended to indicate typical areas of investigation which emerge as worthy of further consideration. *They are not to be interpreted as the recommendations of the Conference, nor as a social science program for Project RAND.* The Conference was not unanimous in its judgment of the value of the inquiries described, and the selection of these particular projects for summarization is somewhat arbitrary. From the standpoint of RAND's further activity, they constitute, not specific research projects, but rather broad areas within which such projects might be designed as becomes necessary in the course of dealing with the problems posed by the directive.

I. STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND MORALE

The morale of a group may be regarded as the persistence of its activity for group goals in the face of various types of defeat and frustration, actual or threatened. Knowledge of morale provides a basis for predictions of the response of the group to specified stimuli. No precise indices, however, are available for the measurement of morale. Moreover, there are not available adequate data, on the level of public apprehension of threats to physical security, usable as a baseline for estimation of shifts in morale under the impact of changing events. Questions arise, also, as to the effectiveness of fear as a motivation for support of a national defense program, and of possible substitute motivations. Both extensive and intensive interview methods can be employed for data on the level of apprehension. An experimental approach might also be used to test the effectiveness in a community of various symbols and other devices affecting morale.

Problems of psychological warfare are closely connected with those of morale. Study of psychological warfare is not limited to the use of propaganda, but also includes effects of political maneuvers and of direct military actions. Data on the wartime operations should be examined and more fully exploited. Most of these data concern what was done; little information is available as to the effectiveness of the activities. Existing analyses of psychological warfare consist largely of official self-servicing appraisals. Studies should be made of the experience of other countries as well as that of our own. Of particular interest are studies of the emotional impact of bombing, both on the victims and in its repercussions on the home population (e.g., fear of retaliation).

CRISIS AND DISASTER SITUATIONS

The problem is one of determining the disaster-meeting potential of various communities and sectors of the population, and of learning techniques for coping with disaster situations. What is the effect of the disaster on the victims, and on those identifying with them or otherwise psychologically related to them? What personnel is best employed for dealing with the situation — what members of the community assume the functions of leadership, how do they exercise these functions, how are antidisaster specialists to be trained? What practices (including the dissemination of symbols) are most effective — methods of maintaining medical and other community services, methods of rapid therapy and of group therapy, techniques of crowd control and of intervening in tense situations?

Situations to be studied range from large-scale physical destruction to demoralizing rumors; from chronic hardships to acute cataclysms; from protracted threats of impending disaster to unexpected inflictions of damage; from natural disasters to the effects of negligence and of deliberate intent to injure. Available data from wartime experience should be analyzed — victims of bombings, concentration-camp inmates, etc. Advance provision can be made for the adequate observation and analysis of unexpected disasters by teams of researchers and antidisaster specialists equipped with a variety of the relevant scientific and practical skills.

AMERICAN GOALS AND VALUES

Preventing the outbreak of war and winning the war if one occurs is not an adequate specification of objectives for the guidance of policy. The problem is one of stating more precisely our standards of choice in policy formation — in particular, so as to avoid reaching decisions on the basis of immediate and limited ends rather than on the whole spectrum of long-range American objectives. The problem is also one of salesmanship, both internal and external — i.e., presenting these objectives and their warrant so as to induce favorable expectations of the future for America. Such expectations are especially important with regard to the in-between world, both its masses and its elite (especially the intellectuals). The problem involves analyzing the effect of traditions on American policy, with regard to their ideological attractiveness and their political realism. And it involves, too, analyzing the validity of the Marxist doctrine of social development as applied to the United States, Russia and elsewhere.

Underlying these problems of foreign-policy objectives and their presentation are questions of the values that are held, in ideology and in action, by policy-makers and by the population at large. The question is one of core attitudes as distinguished from topical opinions: their differential diffusion and intensity in various sectors of the population and at various moments through time, and psychological and social conditions fostering or counteracting them. Among the attitudes of particular interest are those bearing on political participation and apathy. Problems to be considered here include: degrees of abstention from participation in the political process; types of conscious and unconscious motivation of such apathy; environmental and predispositional conditions enhancing or reducing political apathy; optimal degrees of political participation for purposes of democratic functioning in various situations. Especially relevant to the general problem is the formation of attitudes on foreign affairs. The factors to be studied here would include private attitudes, previous political attitudes, social position, the nature of the events involved, and mass and personal communications received.

In addition to the study of core attitudes are some related questions concerning opinions, and the factors (in addition to propaganda) influencing opinion, such as the "opinion leader" in the community. Possibilities emerge here for the coordination and further analysis of opinion polls, and for studies of indirect expressions of and influences on opinion, such as books and movies.

II. STUDIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

DECISION-MAKING AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN THE U.S.S.R.

The problem is first one of clarifying the motivations of the decisions and policies followed by the Russian political and military elite. To what extent are these decisions determined by considerations of Marxist doctrine or of Russian national interest? What is the relation of ideology to practice — is it guide or ritual? And what is the effect on the conception of Russian national interest of particular internal and external pressures? Contributions to the answers to these questions can be made by a study of the records of negotiations and conferences in which the Russians participated, as well as by interviews with available American participants. Content analyses can be made of Russian publications, with special reference to the attacks on them for which they find it important to offer rebuttal, and to their treatment of U.S. policy. Such materials must be interpreted in conjunction with character studies of the Russian elite as well as of the mass ("national character"). A cultural analysis of politically important terms and concepts (e.g., "freedom") is also called for.

The second and more general aspect of the problem is analyzing internal weaknesses in the social structure of the USSR. The Kennan policy of dealing with Russia is justified only if it is correct to assume the existence of internal weaknesses in the USSR which can be exploited for American aims. The task is therefore one of localizing actual and potential tensions within the elite, among rival sub-elites, and between elite and mass. Possible tension points might be studied from the stand-

point of Russia's basic problems which transcend ideology — the diversified nationalities and cultures which it comprises, hostilities engendered by the operation of a ramified bureaucracy, etc. (A special problem as to elite-mass tensions concerns the structure of totalitarian morale. Individual morale in a totalitarian country may be expendable; the total of individual attitudes might be of little significance for the strength of the whole system.) Changes in internal pressures can be surveyed, and their effect noted on Russian conceptions of their "national interest" — as indicated, for example, by changing frequencies in Russian communications of demands made in the name of various constituent groupings. The problem for policy is to determine how existing tensions can be exploited by American acts so as to affect the relative influence of alternative elites within the USSR. A contribution might be made here by an analysis and evaluation of past experience in dealing with dictatorships in crisis situations, with special reference to the internal effects of external action.

CIVILIAN AND MILITARY POLICY

Military considerations have an increasing impact on foreign policy. During a war, the shaping of foreign policy may be relegated almost entirely to military decisions. (For example, the existence of allies or neutrals in Western Europe may be unimportant from a military viewpoint if a war would have to be fought from bases in the continental U.S.) This situation presents the task of enhancing the efficiency of military operations by securing full civilian understanding of its problems. But it requires also increasing the degree to which nonmilitary objectives are taken into account in the formation of military policy. Military strategy must be evaluated in terms of its consequences for the broad goals of American action; war, when it occurs, is an instrument of civilian policy. In particular, the civilian peace strategy must be taken account of in defensive preparations, lest this strategy be jeopardized or war brought about under unfavorable circumstances. Specific problems arise from the concept of "military necessity" used as a justification for various decisions. There are different degrees of civilian-military competition in varying zones of activity (logistics, psychological warfare, etc.). Special difficulties arise in the administration of occupied areas and in the determination of grand strategies in war. And problems arise from the fact that maximum disclosure helps maintain civilian primacy in policy formation, while minimal disclosure is required for military security.

Solution of such problems requires the invention of new administrative expediences, involving, for instance, the use of institutions like the War College to further mutual understanding. An analysis of past institutional relationships — in this country, England, Nazi Germany, and the USSR — may contribute useful materials. Classical analyses of the relations between civilian and military institutions, studies of militarism, etc., should also be surveyed.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Studies in the broad field of U.S. foreign policy require, first, a clarification of that policy, both in terms of official statements and in terms of action in fact undertaken. How is our policy understood by others, both at home and abroad? What

is the intensity of resistance, domestically, to various directions of change in this policy? General problems of foreign relations include: demoralizing potential enemies, winning allies, maintaining internal support of foreign policy, appraisal of the future significance of neutrality and its possibility for various parts of the in-between world, and problems of consolidation of peace after a possible war. Particular problems are posed by the complex interaction of foreign with domestic policy (as illustrated by our relations with China), and by our support of certain anti-Communist elements with results counter to other long-range American objectives (illustrated by our policy on nationalization and collectivism in Europe).

In this respect the role of the Christian and Social Democratic parties in Furope is particularly important to understand. How will such middle parties behave in crisis: Will they maintain their independence of communist pressure or succumb to it? Similar considerations apply to the role of other transnational groupings of political import (e.g., the Vatican). A special problem is constituted by the possibility of revolutionary changes in the in-between world and elsewhere. To what extent is the Leninist concept of revolution valid today, in the light of changes in military technology which concentrate overwhelming power in the hands of the existing state? On this basis, the technique of the *coup d'état* becomes of crucial importance. Study is called for of the preconditions, methods, and consequences of the *coup d'état*. Attitude data may contribute to reliable prediction here, and might be made available, say, through the cooperation of such organizations as the French Institute of Public Opinion. Plans for analysis of attitudes can be laid in advance as a contribution to the understanding of a post-*coup* situation.

III. STUDIES IN ECONOMICS

ECONOMIC WAR POTENTIAL OF RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES

What is the relation of the economic and the political organization in these countries — i.e., how much economic power is available for political purposes (coercion, competition, support) and for direct military action? What is the allocation of resources as between military and civilian requirements? Answers to such questions involve consideration of the availability of raw materials, the existence of critical shortages, the economic value of recent Russian expansion, and the general industrial capacity, as indicated, say, by limitations on real *per capita* income in peacetime, together with trends in productivity.

Adaptation of economic potential to military purposes will require a rapid and efficient mobilization: if war comes, its coming will be sudden and swift. What means and how much time are required for transformation to a war economy in the two countries? What preparations have been or can be made to expedite this transformation? What related transformations will have to be made in social and political institutions? (Conversion plans formulated prior to American participation in World War II were not in fact used.) What is the effect of a limitation on profits, of the absence or presence of a provision for reimbursement for losses incurred in war production, and of the severe sanctions for "inefficiency" imposed by the Russians? What is the feasibility of interchange of parts and personnel in the industrial machine?

In addition to general analyses in economic theory, studies are required of the estimates and errors made during the war, by a collation and analysis of the materials from the WPB and other agencies. Russian language material can be exploited, and cross-comparisons instituted to check consistency and appraise the validity of the economic data given. Wartime intelligence data can be re-examined from the standpoint of uncovering clues to economic potential that might have been used. Of particular interest here are German import-export statistics, and the possibilities of analysis of Russian foreign trade as clues to internal economic trends.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL FRICTION

The objective here is not so much to reach definitive conclusions as to make conscious and explicit the general framework of assumptions on economic causes of war involved in other studies and especially in the formation of policy. Such assumptions, once they are made explicit, can be critically appraised. Much will be gained, apart from such evaluation, by clearing away the fetishes and myths that obstruct fresh analyses. American economists have in the past been insufficiently concerned with the strategic and military problems of economics.

Such hypotheses as that war is occasioned by poverty and distress can be checked against recent historical materials. Have the aggressive countries been the most economically backward or distressed? Have they been most aggressive in their foreign policy when their economic position at home was improved or when it had deteriorated? Is the promotion of prosperity a barrier to war — does a country start war at the top of a boom or in the depths of depression? (Germany in the 19th and 20th centuries seems to have been aggressive when prosperous and conciliatory when facing economic difficulties.) What is the correlation between the business cycle and aggressiveness in foreign policy? Specific economic conditions predisposing to war are amenable to study on the basis of objective data: population pressures, scarcities of strategic materials (like oil, uranium), the effort to find international outlets for economic surpluses, the need to gain political control over resources previously available by exchange, the striving for access to investment.

Economic aspects of internal unity and disunity are also directly relevant to the general problem. What is the effect of income distribution on such unity? What effect do internal frictions have on predispositions to war? What segments of the population provide aggressive leadership and what parts follow such leadership? The role of organized business, labor, agriculture and other sections of the economy is to be analyzed, both in terms of individual attitudes and of what they strive for as organizations.

ECONOMIC PREPAREDNESS: STOCKPILING AND REDUCTION OF VULNERABILITY

If war occurs, it is likely that it will have to be fought altogether with stockpiled materials because of its great and rapid destructiveness. Stockpiling will also be necessary to carry the civilian economy through a catastrophe. The general objective of a stockpiling program is to make available during the war

resources to which we do not have direct and immediate access, and preserving those to which we do have access. Various programs are to be surveyed for their consistency and effectiveness with regard to this objective: for instance, they may increase war potential directly, but indirectly decrease it by encouraging the continuance of uneconomic capital equipment. Stockpiling carried on in the ordinary course of business is to be studied in relation to the formal programs, and this also applies to the resources and capacities of potential allies. Moreover, programs must be appraised in the total context of the economy — e.g., their effect on international relations as indicating preparedness for war, and their possible use to counteract cyclic fluctuations in the economy as a whole.

Stockpiling is only one phase of economic preparedness for the eventuality of war. The more general objective is that of protecting the economic bases of our military strength and minimizing casualties and the destruction of property. The problem immediately arises of the probable nature and scale of an attack, if one should come, especially in its implications of the lack of time to prepare after war has been declared. We also come immediately upon problems of so-called catastrophe economics — e.g., the elasticity of substitution of resources. In addition to stockpiling, possible methods of economic preparedness include relocation of industry and population and preparation of physical protection. Studies should be made of present trends in dispersal of industry and population and of the effects on these trends of various governmental policies (e.g., the structure of freight rates). Industries important to the war effort can be separately studied. Minimizing of casualties involves preparation for emergency evacuation, permanent dispersion of population, providing shelters, protective physical construction, and plans for disaster control and relief. Important urban areas should be separately studied. The timing and over-all cost of a vulnerability-reduction program must be carefully appraised, in terms of the problem of implementing in a democracy such large-scale readjustments. Political and socio-psychological resistance to technological adaptation is a crucial element in the problem.

FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

A large part of the world economy is now, and presumably will be for some time, in need of economic assistance from the U.S. This fact confers major importance on the question of the most efficient use of economic means for foreign policy objectives. There is needed a historical study of the techniques, problems, and consequences of past programs of economic aid, leading to a determination and appraisal of the postulates of the Marshall and other plans for economic reconstruction. Of special interest is the problem of the conditions and possibility of the economic viability of Western Europe. Another basic question is the effect on the power pattern of the spread of industrialization and agricultural development. Will international frictions be mitigated by reducing the disparity between developed and relatively undeveloped countries? Investigation of such questions can be directly related to area studies — for instance, of China and the Latin-American countries. A comparative study can be made of the plans for economic development worked out by the backward countries themselves; data on such countries can be systematically collected and analyzed, in doctoral dissertations, for example. Programs of foreign economic aid must be appraised also, of course, in terms of their domestic repercussions. Public relations with regard to such programs (prior announcements, changes, etc.) also present special problems.

IV. STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

CONTENT ANALYSIS AND INTELLIGENCE

The technique of content analysis makes possible objective and sometimes quantitative inferences to control and supplement impressionistic intelligence. It is especially useful with regard to intelligence on other than physical weapons, relying as it does on indirect and even remote interrelations which are difficult to conceal. Possible applications are to appraising the characteristics of an enemy mass, helping determine the effectiveness of various types of appeal and strategies of psychological warfare; localizing critical tension points within the enemy elite; determining enemy reaction to U.S. acts and pronouncements; identification of more friendly components of the enemy elite; intelligence as to elite intentions.

The problem is one of determining to what extent content analysis can be usefully employed for these and other objectives. What is the relation between the inferences actually made in Anglo-American content-analysis operations during the war and those we now see could (or could not) have been made? What lessons can be derived from the war record as to the optimal methods for selection, training, and organization of personnel for content-analysis operations? How can effective liaison be established between these operations and policy-makers for optimal exploitation of intelligence for policy? Data of war-time operations are to be analyzed, from such groups as the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, and also the analyses made by various countries of the output of others. Reliability and validity of content-analysis procedures can be checked by comparison with results from other methods. Controlled experiments on the value of inferences from selected materials (e.g., in scientific journals) can also be designed.

SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE

The conduct of foreign policy by a democratic government and of military affairs in a matrix of science and technology pose a painful dilemma: On the one hand, secrecy is often required for political and military security; on the other hand, disclosure is necessary for maintenance of civilian control, for the preservation of the possibilities of criticism, for integration of the efforts of distinct agencies, for the encouragement of scientific cooperation. The problem is therefore one of determining the consequences of varying degrees of disclosure to groups of varying characteristics: what should be disclosed to whom? Special difficulties arise from the fact that frequently disclosure of partial information is misleading as to the whole story, that certain information is a secret to which the United States is only one party, and that leakages are employed to serve special ends — e.g., as trial balloons, or as weapons in the contest for appropriations and prestige.

It is hopeless to attack the problem unless initiative and support for the undertaking come directly from the services themselves, so that results of the investigation would have prospects of being implemented. The present system of security classification of materials is to be surveyed, with the aim of arriving at a rational set of objective criteria of secrecy, in accord with the long-range national interest. Such a survey and analysis is to be supplemented by a study, through interviews and in other ways, of notable instances of errors during the war in such classification.

V. RESEARCH METHODS AND ORGANIZATION

TECHNIQUES OF ATTITUDE MEASUREMENT

During the war several new techniques of scaling in measurement of attitudes bearing on morale were developed, leading to somewhat different results. Examination of their logical and mathematical bases promises rapid development in the whole field, especially from the coordination of efforts by specialists in various disciplines. Quantification in social psychology is acquiring increasing importance; progress here will be of permanent value, as contrasted with the temporary relevance of many specific inquiries. The greatest contribution of the social sciences to the war effort was in trained personnel and special techniques, rather than in pre-existent knowledge brought to bear on new problems. Further development of methods is of special value for the unknown future, in which it will be necessary to carry out research quickly and efficiently.

COMPOSITION OF RESEARCH TEAMS

The problem is to determine the composition and organization of a research team which favors achievement in the shortest time, or the greatest ultimate achievement. Among the variables entering into the problem are: the type of task to be dealt with, the number of persons on the team, the skills needed, desirable personality characteristics, structure of the team, techniques of its operation. Possibilities of training for cooperative research can also be explored. A study is to be made of the work of the operations-analysis groups in England and the U.S. during the war, of the selection tests used by the OSS and others to screen personalities for group work, and of the operation of mixed teams in industry and elsewhere. Pilot studies of the problem on an experimental basis which have already been made at Harvard and at Project RAND indicate possibilities in the experimental approach. Results of such investigations can be directly applied to many problems of military research, especially operations analysis, and to various problems in the sciences — for instance, content analysis and the study of crisis and disaster situations described earlier.

RELIABILITY OF PREDICTION

Decision makers must frequently rely on expert predictions and guesses without any objective basis for appraising the judgment or methods of improving it other than through developments in the underlying theory. The problem is to determine the optimal techniques for the exploitation of such predictions by suitable selection and combination of expert judgments and by the use of ancillary data by which the prediction might be appraised — e.g., statements of confidence in and basis for the prediction. The problem can be approached experimentally, as well as by expert analyses of their own past errors, by psychological study of how successful predictions were arrived at, and by statistical analyses of various systems of combining and weighing judgments. Relevant data can also be accumulated in the course of routine operations in which expert predictions are sought. Although the likelihood of yield in such an investigation is not high, even slight improvements in reliability will be of incalculable value to realistic policy formation.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

(Note: The affiliation is listed merely as part of the address. The participants were invited to the Conference, and accepted, as individuals.)

Name	Address
Armen Alchian	Department of Economics University of California Los Angeles, California
Mortimer Andron	Department of Social Science University of California Santa Barbara College Santa Barbara, California
Chester I. Barnard	New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. Newark, New Jersey
Ruth Benedict	Department of Anthropology Columbia University New York, New York
Bernard Berelson	Graduate Library School University of Chicago Chicago, Illinois
Bernard Brodie	Institute of International Studies Yale University New Haven, Connecticut
Ansley J. Coale	Department of Economics Princeton University Princeton, New Jersey
Frank R. Collbohm	Acting Director, Project RAND Santa Monica, California
Charles Dollard	Carnegie Corporation New York, New York
William T.R. Fox	Institute of International Studies Yale University New Haven, Connecticut
Herbert Goldhamer	Sociology Department University of Chicago Chicago, Illinois
Horace M. Gray	Institute of Government and Public Affairs University of Illinois Urbana, Illinois

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS *(Cont'd)*

Name	Address
Olaf Helmer	Evaluation Section Project RAND Santa Monica, California
Lawrence J. Henderson, Jr.	Washington Representative, Project RAND Washington, D.C.
Pendleton Herring	Carnegie Corporation New York, New York
C.J. Hitch	Fellow, Queen's College Oxford University Oxford, England
Clark L. Hull	Institute of Human Relations Yale University New Haven, Connecticut
Abraham Kaplan	Department of Philosophy University of California Los Angeles, California
Ernst Kris	New School for Social Research New York, New York
Harold D. Lasswell	Yale Law School Yale University New Haven, Connecticut
Frank Lorimer	Institute of Population Statistics Princeton University Princeton, New Jersey
Donald Marquis	Department of Psychology University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan
Frederick Mosteller	Department of Social Relations Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts
Franz Neumann	Department of Political Science Columbia University New York, New York
William F. Ogburn	Department of Sociology University of Chicago Chicago, Illinois
Louis N. Ridenour	Dean, The Graduate College University of Illinois Urbana, Illinois

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS *(Cont'd)*

Name	Address
Edward Shaw	Department of Economics Stanford University Palo Alto, California
Hans Speier	New School for Social Research New York, New York
Samuel Stouffer	Department of Social Relations Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts
Jacob Viner	Department of Economics Princeton University Princeton, New Jersey
Allen Wallis	The School of Business University of Chicago Chicago, Illinois
Warren Weaver	Division of Natural Sciences Rockefeller Foundation New York, New York
S.S. Wilks	Department of Mathematics Princeton University Princeton, New Jersey
J.D. Williams	Evaluation Section Project RAND Santa Monica, California
Donald Young	Social Science Research Council New York, New York

CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL SCIENTISTS

September 14 to 19, 1947

New York

OPENING PLENARY

F.R. Collbohm
Warren Weaver

I imagine a lot of people here might be puzzled as to what an aircraft company is doing sponsoring a meeting of this sort. There is a little history behind that.

Toward the end of the War, officers in all of the military services began to get worried about the fact that they were about to lose the benefits of the scientific and industrial brains that they made such good use of during the War. Many discussions took place about this matter, not just in the Air Forces but also in the Army and the Navy, and many plans were discussed as to how this critical situation could be met. It was thought that it might be a good idea to set something up in an educational institution or in the services themselves, along the lines of the Operational Analyses Groups they already had. It was finally decided, after all the pros and cons had been weighed, that it would probably be most effective if it were set up in an industrial organization. That was based upon reasons that had to do with the restrictions that handicap scientists if they're working directly for the military or even directly for the government; in some cases it had to do with the flexibility that private industrial concerns can offer in their operations.

There was also discussion as to how such a project should be tied into the government, and talk about high level procurement of that type of research. It was recognized that it could not answer to the ordinary materiel procurement agencies -- they wouldn't have the people to know how to deal with it. But since there was no high level procurement agency, it looked as though it would be some time before something like that was set up. General Arnold finally decided to grab the ball and run with it. If at some later date things were so arranged in the military that a better organization to handle such a national project could be worked up, the Air Forces would be ready to relinquish this project to that new organization.

That's the way it started. Its present status is that RAND answers to the Air Forces' top Staff for all policy matters. The contract matters have to be handled by a procurement agency that's already set up, namely, Wright Field; but Wright Field does not have anything to do with the operation of the Project. Even the Air Forces top Staff has set rules for itself, to the effect that the RAND Project is for the purpose of advising the military what to do, and therefore the military cannot tell RAND what to do, but must confine itself to telling RAND what others are doing. Furthermore, it makes available to RAND information in other fields, intelligence, plans, etc., so that RAND can base its operations on knowledge given it by the military, but not on directives given it by the military.

Another question is, Why was Douglas selected? The answer to that is rather simple. First, the Air Force is used to working with the aircraft industry. They know the people, they know their capabilities. Second, they had a survey made, and as a result of that survey came to the conclusion that there was no organization that could do it any better than Douglas. Maybe others could do it as well, but they couldn't see any advantage in going to another one. The final clinching argument favoring Douglas was that Douglas itself was interested, and had already started thinking and acting in this field.

Douglas got a prime contract with the understanding that Douglas by itself could not operate the Project. There aren't enough brains in any one organization to do this job. So Douglas has organized it as an autonomous group within the Douglas Company corporate structure, but otherwise free of the normal red-tape routine of a manufacturing enterprise. We've even moved the Project away from the Douglas Company factory. We have our own building in downtown Santa Monica. We have there a group of about 150 of the best people we have been able to find in the country. In addition to that, we have help from industrial concerns by the use of subcontracts. We have a number of subcontractors all over the country working in special fields of the over-all project. And we have consultants in almost all fields, and geographically spread all over the country. Where possible, we tried even to have teams of consultants in each place, so that their ideas could cross-fertilize. This has worked out very well.

The last aspect of the matter is, Why did Douglas ever go into it? Partly, Douglas went into it as a public service. Mr. Douglas himself and others there were just as concerned as the military people about the situation developing. Another thing that helped Douglas management make up its mind was this. The management had already been considering that the aircraft industry was approaching the age at which it was time to set up an organization for fundamental research in this field, rather than just product research. This concept emerged at about that time, so that the Douglas management was receptive.

It turns out now that the RAND Project has become much broader than the original conception. Its evolution has tended to go in two directions. At the one extreme, we are getting to the point where we have to analyze the achievability of individual gadgets, in order to bring them into broader analyses, so we can make quantitative predictions of systems of conducting intercontinental warfare. On the other hand, we have broadened out so far as to culminate in this Conference.

I'm going to ask Warren Weaver -- whose stimulating ideas are perhaps most responsible for broadening the concept of RAND -- to describe its growth. Dr. Weaver is going to talk in his capacity as a RAND Consultant. He has been with us right from the start, and I want to say that I have personally depended very greatly upon Dr. Weaver's judgment and help. If there are any here who don't know him, I might say that he created and headed the Applied Mathematics Panel of the NDRC during the war and is now connected with the Rockefeller Foundation as Director for the Natural Sciences. Dr. Weaver.

There's a curious assortment of individuals in this room at the present time -- I didn't say an assortment of curious individuals, but a curious assortment of individuals. There is at least one person who is primarily an electrical engineer, one who is primarily an astronomer interested in meteors, two whose backgrounds are largely mathematical

and one who is an aeronautical engineer. Having mentioned them, I think I have named most of those who come primarily from the physical sciences. Then there is the distinguished president of the New Jersey Telephone Company, who is also a sociologist and many other things; and there are also a lot of you who represent, one after another, the disciplines, interests, and curiosities of the social sciences.

Why are we here? I suppose, in one very real sense because the RAND officials asked us to come. But why did we come? Why are we here in this room?

I take it that however diverse our backgrounds are, there are at least three things that tie us all together, and give a certain unity to the group.

I assume that every person in this room is fundamentally interested in and devoted to what can broadly be called the rational life. He believes fundamentally that there is something to this business of having some knowledge, and some experience, and some insight, and some analysis of problems, as compared with living in a state of ignorance, superstition, and drifting-into-whatever-may-come. I presume that we all fundamentally believe in the rational life. I rather carefully did not say the logical life, because I am not as exclusively strong for the logical life as I am for what I mean by the rational life. I think there are some things that we need to talk about that are not very logical, but which are still awfully important; and I would include an intelligent interest in alogical elements within what I mean by an enthusiasm for the rational life.

I take it that secondly we are all of us fundamentally interested in the state of the world, and, as a matter of fact, not so very enthusiastic about it; and I believe that all of us would most desperately like to do something about that if we possibly could. In other words, I think that we are interested, not in war, but in peace; and that if there is anything that any one of us can do, by any possible effort he can bring to bear, he wants to do it.

Thirdly, I assume that every person in this room is desperately dedicated to the ideals of democracy, and that every person here wants to do anything he possibly can toward the furtherance of those ideals. Not by imposing them on other individuals -- I don't mean that -- but by so running our own business, so cleaning our own house, and so improving our own relations with the rest of the world, that the value of those ideals in which we believe becomes thereby evident. I take it that the devotion that we have to that ideal has as part of it -- a perfectly real part which we are sometimes backed down to, which we have backed down to in the past, and which we may be backed down to again in the future -- the fact that *if* it comes to a showdown where there is no other alternative, then we are desperately concerned to do everything we can for the defense of our country. That is an alternative which we accept when there is no other alternative.

I take it that we are bound together by those three things. If we aren't, I don't think we ought to be here. I don't think anybody ought to be in this room who doesn't subscribe to them. That is an important set of bonds for all the people in this room.

You may say, If that is what we are interested in, then why are we here under the formal auspices of the Army Air Forces and the Douglas Aircraft Company? Some

would say, as Mr. Collbohm intimated, that there is something just a little anomalous, at first sight even a little grotesque, in a group of individuals with the set of backgrounds and interests that we represent coming together under such auspices. As Mr. Collbohm intimated, that's a rather queer sort of story.

It's a story that I find quite agreeable -- partly, I suppose, because I'm something of an opportunist, and when I find a good place to do something good, I don't worry too much about the formalities of the auspices.

Also, because I happen to believe very firmly in *variety* as a typical element of American strength, I think there should be a lot of organizations working a lot of ways on these problems. And if, in the opinion of any one in this room, this seems to be one of the funny ways of working at it, may I just ask him to be for the moment a little patient in his judgment, and to say, "All right, suppose it is a funny way to work at it. It's something that ought to be done, and let me just ride along a little while and see what happens." But I would like to tell you briefly why *I* don't think it is a funny way, and why I think it can be very effective.

I have had the somewhat dubious pleasure, over the last 30 or 31 years, of spending distinctly more than one-fifth of my life and pretty close to one-fourth of it in working for the military in two wars, largely in connection with the application of one or another field of science, primarily mathematics in its application to military problems. It wasn't a wholly disagreeable nor wholly stupid activity, but I am getting pretty fed up with it, and I am not awfully anxious to put in another five or six years at it, or to have any of my kids do so. What makes me think that there is something interesting and important and, after all, promising about the set of things we are going to talk over during the next week? I think that some very important things happened between World War I and the end of World War II with respect to the possibility that this kind of enterprise could have a really constructive and significant effect on what happens. I want to mention briefly a few things that I think happened that contribute to that. Some of these are so obvious that I need only mention them and pass on.

First, war has become an oppressively technical and complicated business, and not only that, but defense and the necessary preparation for defense have become correspondingly complex.

They have not only become oppressively technical and complicated, but they have also become all-inclusive -- they have become universal. A lot of distinctions that used to hold, hold no longer. The distinction between the military and the civilian in modern war is, to all intents and purposes, negligible. It doesn't make much difference whether you are a plumber in London and get killed by a bomb, or whether you are an infantryman at the front -- you are just as dead afterwards. Modern war obviously involves whole populations, and the distinction between the civilian and the military is essentially gone. Not only is that distinction essentially lost, but there is a hint that other important distinctions have gone by the board, such as the distinction between war and peace. Mr. Baruch's phrase, which is now becoming current, in which he refers to the present state of affairs as a "cold war," is, of course, a recognition of that face. We are in a sense fighting a different kind of war right now.

As a result of this, the military has come to realize (and, I think, to realize completely and honestly) that they have to accept and want to accept a type of partnership with civilians and a type of partnership with competence wherever they may find it, such as they have not been interested in accepting in the past.

I believe that to be a perfectly genuine wish on their part. They have said it in completely unambiguous terms. Mr. Eisenhower has said it in a series of quite remarkable statements; but over and beyond that, I am convinced that they mean it now. I think that the most significant proof of that is this: they have now reached the point where they admit civilians on the planning level. And I tell you that that is pretty near the critical question.

They were quite willing to accept civilians on a certain service level in the past. They used to say, "We like to have you around, and if you are awfully smart we will ask you questions and you will answer them as well as you can; but then we will go into another room and shut the door and make our decisions." That, in the past, they were quite willing to do. Now, however, they want us in the back room with them. They want to talk over the really fundamental questions, and they are actually admitting civilians at the planning level. That, I think, is very significant.

In the past there appeared to be a group of the military who considered that they not only had the responsibility of the defense of our country, but that in a certain rather curious sense they sort of owned it, and that it wasn't quite cricket for civilians to be very much concerned about it. They have gotten over that, and I think that a good number of civilians have, too.

Certainly, it has become perfectly obvious that we get nowhere in the world as it is organized and run today -- we get nowhere in the problems of defense -- nowhere in the problem of maintaining our country at that level of living on which we wish to continue -- unless we pool all of our resources. Goodness knows, we have to pool them for war, and I think that this brings to bear upon a large number of intellectual enterprises a thoroughly healthy pressure. I think that pressure results in drawing together and amalgamating a large number of intellectual enterprises which in the past have by no means been isolated, but which I think have not been associated as closely as they should be in the future. I think that, in particular, the whole fields of the social sciences and of the physical sciences must be brought more closely together. The social scientists and physical scientists have to learn to work together in a way in which they have not worked together in the past.

Furthermore, I think that we have learned from the last war certain useful, comfortable and effective patterns for working together that we did not know before. I think it is a great shame that the real history of operational research, particularly as it was carried on in Great Britain, has not been made more generally known. As I think most of you in this room know, Great Britain had to throw together groups of individuals to carry out fundamental analyses of some of the over-all problems that were facing them in waging their defensive war. They found it necessary -- for they didn't have enough physicists or engineers or mathematicians to go round -- to pick out *mixed teams*. Indeed, that's precisely what they called them. They would make up a team out of a sociologist, a psychologist, a lawyer, an architect, an electrical

engineer, and a physical chemist; and they would say, "Now, you have to study the following problem". Say, the convoy problem. "How do we get stuff across the Atlantic? What is the character of the convoy problem?"

This problem comprises a thousand factors, some of which are quantitative; but most of the important ones are not quantitative, and the problem depends on all sorts of emotional factors. How tired is the man on watch? How well did he sleep last night? What's he thinking about? Is he thinking about his girl, or is he thinking about submarines? It depends on all sorts of things that you can't weigh or measure. It is a big problem of organized complexity, but it is terribly important; and one thing about war is that you *have* to get the answers. It isn't like some problems which are academic in the prejorative sense. You *have to get the answer*. You *have* to do something. You *have* to act, either wisely or foolishly.

So these mixed teams started to work on some of these problems of organized complexity, and they learned how to work together. They learned how to focus their different insights and backgrounds of experience, their different disciplines, their different intuitions, and their different feels for problems; and they learned how to add these things together to form something quite obviously greater than the sum of its parts.

I think a new pattern for research began to emerge from that, showing how we can work in the future on some of the problems of organized complexity in the biological and social fields. I am not one of those who happen to think that all you need to do to solve the problems of social science is to obtain a few sufficiently smart engineers, or a few sufficiently smart mathematicians, or, indeed, a few sufficiently smart anybodies. Indeed, I am not overly optimistic about the contribution that, say, mathematical analytical thinking can make in solving problems of social science. I think it can make a big contribution -- far greater than it has. But I am perfectly prepared to have mathematical techniques face whole areas in the social sciences before which they would stand baffled. I do seriously feel, however, that the welding together in this kind of partnership has begun to evolve some patterns of procedure which have great promise for the future. In the past, unfortunately, such cooperation has resulted only from the pressure and necessity of war. Isn't that a rather unhappy commentary on our intellectual life, that we accomplish that kind of partnership only out of desperation to protect ourselves?

I have made till now this one main point: that since the last war there has been a change in the character of war, a change in the character of the inevitable amalgamation of all the intellectual and material resources of the country which are necessary to maintain our position in peace and to enable us to defend ourselves if need arise, a complete change of attitude on the part of the military toward accepting civilians into partnership, no less, in the ownership of these United States. There have also emerged some patterns of working together, particularly among the biological, physical and social sciences, which seem to me to have great promise.

Now, what does all this have to with RAND?

First of all, I don't think you can set up and organize this kind of project within the structure of a university, because there are aspects of it that are neces-

sarily captured within the unhappy coils of military security. I think they can do it successfully during war time, but I believe it is absolutely contrary to the spirit of a free university to do classified work during peace. I don't think any university ought to accept a contract to do classified work.

Therefore, I think that they had to do what they did -- go into some one of the fine, big industrial laboratories. A laboratory should be chosen in which there are lots of people imbued with the research spirit, and where there is a good general background for the kind of war that may possibly have to be fought in the future. Going to an aircraft company is thus a natural thing. Furthermore, there is one thing that Mr. Collbohm didn't say very flatly, and which I think deserves to be said -- that the Douglas Aircraft Company struggled against taking this thing, and really did take it as a patriotic act. They may be intrigued with it by now, but certainly in the beginning they really didn't want it. Moreover, the Douglas Aircraft Company is, so to speak, only a focal point through which an awful lot of bookkeeping goes, and the actual work then spreads out into intellectual enterprises in universities and in many other places in the country. To that I would add what Mr. Collbohm couldn't possibly say, namely, that they are reasonable and intelligent, and are being extraordinarily understanding in their handling of this whole thing.

As to the program of RAND, I am not going to tell you what it started out to be, because it's changed so much since then that it would just be a waste of time. Let me make one or two brief remarks about what it is now.

It has areas with which we have no concern whatsoever. It has, for example, projects of hardware and gadgetry that I assume will not be under discussion and which, as far as I can see, need not be under any discussion here. It has a considerable group staffed largely by mathematicians trying to work along the general lines of seeing what a quantitative logical analytical theory, i.e., a mathematical theory, can accomplish in analyzing general theories of air warfare. This work has a great deal to do with the concept, if indeed there be such a concept, of *military worth,* to see to what extent it is possible to have useful quantitative indices for a gadget, a tactic or a strategy, so that one can compare it with available alternatives and guide decisions by analysis, to the extent that analysis can be shown to be relevant and possible.

To those people who think that these military problems are too complicated, that you never can get enough data, that you can never know the data accurately enough, that you cannot possibly have a theory for such a wide-ranging field of human activity, I say, first of all: Of course, I agree with you. But will you just think for a moment of what I seriously feel to be a reasonable analogy? Think of our friends, the cosmologists -- they want to try to devise a theory of the universe. All of you will agree that that is a reasonably complicated problem to attack -- that knowledge of all the details lies beyond the possibilities of any person or any groups of persons. The amount of information they have about the universe as a whole is in fact pathetically small. And yet, what can they do with it? They can do with it just what I think can be done with any of these problems. They can think awfully hard; and at the end of the thinking, they can make statements of the following kind: "Gentlemen, as regards possible conceptual models of the universe, we can't tell you what kind of a universe this is, but we can tell you that it cannot possibly be such and such kinds, nor (looking in other directions) such and such kinds. The possible kinds of universe, in other words, lie between certain limits which we have established."

That is a remark of extraordinary interest, value, and power. How narrow are those limits? Well, as yet, not very narrow, but they are considerably narrower than the distance between the two end points of an infinite line. Furthermore, the cosmologist can say, "Gentlemen, we can tell you, of those items of information which we do not have, which ones are of the most critical importance in narrowing this gap and sharpening our knowledge of what the universe really is. We can tell you the sensitivity, so to speak, of the boundaries of knowledge with respect to different items of information. We can say to you. 'Please don't strain yourself indefinitely to try to find out *this* particular fact because that is not going to move the boundary of ignorance very far. The boundary of ignorance is surprisingly insensitive to that particular kind of information -- so insensitive that we are satisfied with our present state of knowledge of that. Whereas *this other* factor and *this* factor and *this* factor are critically important, in that the boundaries of ignorance are extremely sensitive to them. The minute you find out anything about that, you sharpen down rapidly."

That again is exceedingly important information, and at the very worst, I am sure that information of that sort can be gotten in the most complicated of these military problems. That is my answer to the man who says, "Why attempt analytical theories of air warfare? Why attempt to struggle with the concept of military worth?"

But we are not here to discuss mathematical theories of war. In a very broad sense, we are here to look into the problem of *weapon* and *target analysis*. But what are the weapons and targets? They are not just pieces of hardware, nor men, nor ships. They are not even a lot of ships, and a lot of men, and a lot of hardware. They are that, but not that exclusively. They are every piece of knowledge that we have -- every piece of knowledge we have in sociology and in economics and in political science, everything we know about social psychology, everything we know about propaganda, everything we know about enemy morale, everything we know about learning things in some foreign countries when we do not dare ask the questions that lead directly to that piece of knowledge. Who knows how to design a set of questions that you ask, to find out not the answer to those questions but to another hidden question? A good trial lawyer knows that procedure perfectly well.

Every piece of information of that sort, I say, is a weapon, so that when I say we are here for weapons analysis, I mean that we are here to think how the disciplines that we represent can contribute to the maximum ability of our country to maintain its position in peace and to improve its relationship with the rest of the world, so that our position in peace will be stable. How can we assess the probable imminence of war? And, if war should ever again become unavoidable, how can we also improve all our knowledge of every item of potential national strength which can be brought to bear on the problem of defense?

There is a real danger in becoming so concerned with the hardware weapons that one gradually loses interest in the more constructive possibility of avoiding war. It is inevitable that the military are particularly subject to this risk. This makes it all the more important that civilians also be concerned with defense. I think it is our duty as citizens to be so concerned. I think it is an intellectual and moral duty of very considerable dimensions.

I happen to think that this enterprise offers a good working possibility for persons who are interested in these problems and who consider them an obligation of

citizenship. I hope there will be other frameworks. I hope there will eventually be an even more appropriate framework than the Army Air Forces' contract to the Douglas Aircraft Company, much as I like the Army Air Forces and much as I like the Douglas Aircraft Company. At the moment, I don't know of a more appropriate framework. I know the research and development set-up reasonably well in the Army and in the Navy, because I have such connections as make it my business to know it, and I don't know anything that is any better. Furthermore, I think it is a really good set-up, not just the least bad one. Therefore, I am perfectly willing to put into it such of my energy as I think I can honestly spare from my other obligations. Within the limits of my responsibility to my prime employer, I am interested in this enterprise and am glad to put into it any energy that I can, and for the reasons that I have stated.

One of the nice things about this job, at least one of the things that I am awfully happy about, is that you let somebody, whose background is originally that of an engineer and secondly that of a mathematician, into a room with such a number of social psychologists and political scientists and economists. That is, I think, an indication of the direction in which we are moving.

CLOSING PLENARY

W. Weaver (Chairman)

R. Benedict
C. Dollard
H. Goldhamer
H.D. Lasswell
F. Mosteller
W.F. Ogburn
H. Speier
J. Viner
J.D. Williams

Ogburn: The subject matter of Committee I was the control of the factors having to do with social behavior and social forces. The topics discussed in this Committee were, for the most part, set up and designed with some regard to their manageability. Perhaps 25% of the projects were viewed with rather a high degree of favor and perhaps a similar per cent was spoken of with very little appreciation. About 10 to 15 new ideas, if not new projects, were tossed up for reference to the direction of RAND. The interest and the discussion in these projects was, on the whole, encouraging. The spirit of those who read them over, discussed them, and took part in them might be said to be optimistic, and I don't know exactly why there was this optimism. Perhaps it lay in the merit of the particular projects themselves. Perhaps it might also be due to the fact that the Committee did very little with reference to the problems of personnel and of setting it up and spinning it out in detail, and was more concerned with ideas; and there is something stimulating about these ideas. And then, I felt in this Committee and in these panels that there was every day a growing appreciation of the Conference. We may have had the purpose wrong; but I interpreted it as being associated with an application of social science to, let us say, the service of the country in some impending possibility of crisis or disaster. And I think this idea of a sort of workableness of social science lending itself to the country was part of the reason why these people were so good in this meeting. That, together with the various stimulating aspects of the ideas that were thrown up, all led to a very pleasant occasion.

Lasswell: Committee II was devoted to political studies. The general procedure was to consider the kinds of political eventualities which would confront the United States. The effect of this way of talking was to emphasize the fact that the group was less interested in working on specific research projects than in calling attention to the fields or areas of relevancy to problems of this kind. When I mention even briefly the five major fields in which discussion was conducted you will see at once that there was a minimum of detailed specification as to how to proceed on projects. (1) We were concerned first with the problem of demoralizing an enemy, including not only demoralization but also peaceful transformation into a workable member of a world community. (2) A second set of political problems focused around that of gaining the support of allies. (3) Another concerned the problem of neutrality -- whether there was a possibility of neutrality in the political future, and whether or not any acquiescence in a state of neutrality on the part of any community on the globe

Lasswell: was consistent with an assumed set of desired purposes. (4) A fourth topic or area of discussion had to do with the consolidation of peace at the end of a future war. There was little detailed discussion of the possibility that the United States might be confronted by defeat and would have the problem of retaining such elements of power as possible for a future revival. We maintained the attitude for this purpose of the Japanese, who did not discuss the technique of how to behave when captured. (5) We also talked about the continuing contingency which confronts us of how to maintain as many of our democratic values as possible. This, however, was posed in the larger framework of how we can accomplish our foreign policy objectives with a minimum sacrifice of democratic procedures. These five areas of discussion did not prevent the specification, in part, of detailed lines of investigation. They clarified in all of our minds certain of the potentialities, but the research design and planning levels could not be satisfactorily tackled because all of these projects involved teams. Each of the detailed projects that we began to think about could only be formulated satisfactorily if one had a working team representing at least some of the major skills in the social and psychological sciences, and in some cases, the direct and continuing collaboration of specialists in other sciences would be necessary. In general, this was for most of the participants in the round table a clarification of the kinds of contingency which are politically relevant, of the kinds of knowledge which would be pertinent, and of some of the major ways by which this knowledge can be obtained. Finally, there was a minimum of detailed designing of ways and means, the general feeling being that it was necessary to postpone that until one was operating in small, effective, and interrelated teams.

Viner: Committee III dealt with the work of three panels. In the process of the work of all three panels there was a lot of reshuffling and revising of projects, and in a few cases, outright rejection of projects, either as probably not workable or as not relevant to purposes. A good deal of the time in the panel stage was taken up in exploring purposes with a view to getting more guidance as to the suggestions of possible fruitful lines of research. In the process of the work on the three panels and finally of the Committee, we did some reorganization of collections of topics. While I am trusting a good deal to memory, I have jotted down here what I recall as the basic topical headings for areas of research: economic collaboration for purposes of promotion of peace; methods of economic coercion, either to forestall war or to weaken the enemy in the case of contingent war; preparedness for war, including mobilization; the management of a wartime economy; possible techniques for the detection of imminence of war; occupation economics; and the economic consequences of war. It is of extreme importance to have some arrangement of problems so that you get all the aid you can from your organization of topics, to see to it that you are not leaving out some very vital problems that suddenly turn out to have been of extreme importance, and yet not touched on. All through, that sort of organization is needed to check on gaps, as well as to promote coordination and to find out what common elements there are in the projects, so that preliminary work may be done for three or four or more particular projects. That is of primary importance. While in the main our attention was directed towards titles for topics, rather than on design of research or on the substance of the problems, in the course of trying to get the right phrasing for a title or to try and make clear what the project is, there was through the four sessions quite an accumulation of ideas as to substance, as to the nature of the problem, analytical ideas, etc. It is my impression now that of these titles I have given you that there are at least four (the last four) which (partly because the organization came late) were not really worked on very much, and should be examined again to see

Viner: if they don't need extensive expansion. One is the problems of wartime economy and its management. Part of the reason for neglect of detailed discussion was the belief which some of us had that was one of the fields of economics which is already of interest to the profession, on which they have done a lot of work, and will in any case be doing more. On the problems of occupation economics, the discussion in the panel and in the Committee indicated that a good many of the members here, for one reason or another, did not think that that was an important field of work. I am not sure that is right. On the question of techniques for discovering the imminence of war, some of the discussion was misled by too literal reading of the title to a skeptical attack on the possibilities of an arithmetical index or anything of the sort. I believe that the possibilities of something like scientific detection of the imminence of war has not been as thoroughly explored as even a conference of this sort could do. As to the economic war, it may be that the reason that that was relatively neglected was that we were not at all sure that it fell within the range of interest of the RAND Project.

Weaver: Committee IV had a field of activity which differs in kind from those of Committees I, II, and III. Those three committees were dealing primarily with the possible application of the knowledge and insights of three great branches of the social sciences to a set of national problems, whereas Committee IV started at the center of that national problem and raised specific questions about certain military problems, and asked rather, can the social and other sciences come in from the outside and help us with those problems? The Committe comprised two panels, the first of which, Panel 9, was concerned with information both going and coming -- i.e., getting information, which is intelligence, and dispersing information, which is propaganda. In the field of intelligence or the gathering of information, the discussion related primarily to the technique of content analysis and to possible improvements of some sort of systematic theory of the interview. As regards the second topic of dispersing information or of propaganda, there was relatively little discussion in Panel 9, largely on the grounds that that topic appeared to lie more in the fields of other Committees. With respect to Panel 10, whose title was "Military Affairs", the discussion falls under four main topics. They talked about the possibility of general analytical studies of war, there being more than half a dozen projects that in one way or another contributed to that topic. In general, the Panel felt strongly that studies of that sort should be stimulated and should be sponsored. They were long-range, they were difficult, but they should be done. Secondly, they discussed the problem of mobilization and utilization of manpower, and rejected a considerable percentage of the specific proposals, largely on the grounds that a good deal of that work had been competently done and was in competent hands. There were, however, two or three very important exceptions to that remark, the most important one, I think, being that some organization other than the military should study the problem of probable kinds of manpower which would be needed in a future war -- it being possible that universal military training should be devoted largely not to what we normally think of as military training but to the training of very large numbers of firemen, a very large number of first-aid experts, people trained in crisis techniques in general, and not very much at all in "squads right and squads left." The third topic that this Panel considered was the topic of preparation for war. This is one which has recurred in almost every panel and almost every Committee, and we felt it was inadequately represented in the projects before our panel, that there were a variety of topics in that area which should be considered. The panel mentioned particularly the possibility of a study of the theory and practice of the expansion of organizations

Weaver: (that being something which might contribute very markedly to the Army's problem in time of war), the problem of psychological preparation for war in a democracy, and study on the political front of the mechanism of declaration of war (whether the political mechanisms for declaration of war in a democracy are in any sense realistic and workable at the present time). Finally, this Panel spoke about the subject of sabotage. There were one or two things it thought worth doing there, but for the most part felt that those studies would be quite unrealistic and ineffective if they did not arise within the FBI or Central Intelligence.

Mosteller: Committee V was concerned with the organization and utilization of research methods and of research. This Committee considered fifteen projects, two of which they unanimously agreed were extremely important. Seven they torpedoed and six they disposed of in various other manners. Two general fields they felt were most important were problems concerning the composition of research teams, and project evaluation with respect to alternative types of war (general kinds of weapon-target analysis, where we included as part of our "target" things like peace, and as part of our "weapon", means for the preservation of peace.) It needs to be emphasized that the idea of weapon-target analysis can be very nicely included in the idea of attempting to work for and maintain peace. Operations-analysis as a technique in peacetime as well as wartime, and its use in trying to solve research problems connected with maintenance of peace and with operations in war, was considered very heavily by the committee; this, of course, ties very closely to their previous consideration of composition of research teams and their use in this whole kind of work. It was felt that both pure and applied research should be carried on in parallel by RAND, and it was decided that great emphasis should be placed on the necessity for some kind of serious coordination of research projects. The general view might be stated something like this: that the Committee viewed the proposals not as specific research projects but as general areas for longtime research planning, and it was felt that studies in this area call for careful and vigorous design as well as substantial financial support.

Dollard: Panel 13 scooped up everything that was left, and everything that arose during the Conference. In all, Panel 13 considered and recommended nine projects. Of these, three are refinements, expansions or footnotes of other projects considered by previous panels. Of the remaining six, three relate to various phases of disaster preparation. The first was a suggestion that we examine the possibility or the technique of decentralizing authority in the Army, so that in the event of an atomic attack the whole Army could not be paralyzed by destruction of its nerve center. The second had to do with the degree to which the Army depends on civilian sources of supply in metropolitan centers which might be destroyed in an atomic attack. The third had to do with the consideration of a possibility of setting up a civilian disaster machine which would be quite independent of the Army, and which would avoid the hazard of civilian authority turning to the Army and diverting its attention from repulsing the attack to restoring civil order. In addition, Ogburn introduced two concrete projects relating to a matter discussed in other panels, i.e., the necessary change in political and social institutions in time of war to the end of achieving maximum speed, unity and executive force. The title of the project is "Study of the Trend of Economic Factors Affecting Unity and Disunity". The description reads as follows: "The predominant ideology of this country is one of individualism and free competitive economy. The trend of concrete industrial practice is one of limited competition and monopoly, both private and state, both requiring more and more political regulation and leading correspondingly to

Dollard: monopolistic and semi-monopolistic labor unions, also requiring state regulation. Love of technology and the pressure to secure the advantages of mass production and marketing are pushing more and more to centralization and socialist control. This threatens serious disunity from conflict between ideology and practice and perhaps inevitable interference to liberty. This portends both industrial and political disunity."

Goldhamer: I was asked to provide a Conference Summary. The Conference might be summarized in two different ways. One is a summary of findings, and I take it that that is what we have been having from the Committee chairmen in a very broad way. I don't think it is possible in the time we have here to try to boil those findings down to much narrower limits, but I might simply refer to the three headings that were supplied earlier as indicative of RAND's interests, namely, the prevention of war, the spotting of war or the likelihood of war, and then problems that are presented by war itself, either from the standpoint of defensive operations prior to war or offensive operations in war itself. My impression (and I should say that this is purely personal) is that on the side of prevention, the projects contain ideas that obviously are of first-rate significance, but they don't particularly hang together in any one scheme. This is not very surprising, and on the whole it would be difficult to do otherwise. In general, one could think of a hundred projects that are useful for defensive or offensive purposes to one worthwhile project that has relevance for prevention. On the question of indicating the likelihood of war, there were a number of projects that certainly suggest means of sharpening our apprehension of the actualities that we might face. But again that did not seem, for understandable reasons, to fall into a very systematic pattern. On the side of defense, I had the very distinct impression that that field represented more of a systematically worked out area than probably any other field that was considered in the Conference. The problem of adapating the country to the possibility of war was worked out in a way that cut across all of the various disciplines -- the economic acts that would be necessary, the political changes that would be required, the psychological consideration to be taken into account, the entire mobilization and, if you want, "streamlining" of institutions and people in this country. The offense material, it struck me, was again a matter of individual ideas -- offense of extreme ingenuity, but not covering systematically any field.

The second form of summary that might be made might be in terms of the objective that this Conference was intended to reach. In the broadest sense the objective of the Conference was to get RAND started, with all the aid we could give it, on a social science program that would be useful to national security. Before this Conference got under way RAND had been tentatively circling around a rather vast ocean and getting its toes wet feeling what temperature the water was, and this Conference has very effectively precipitated both it and ourselves into the midst of the waves. I don't seem to find any evidence that we are exactly drowning; I think we are managing somehow to keep our heads above water. If one thinks of the task that would face a comparable group if it were asked to sit down and provide help for the formulation of a program of RAND starting from scratch, as compared to what this group could do if it were to deliberate further, from that standpoint it becomes fairly apparent that very real progress has been made.

Another form of progress, quite apart from the substantive material, that cannot be overemphasized, is the fact that a group of social scientists now know the

Goldhamer: problem of RAND as they did not know it before; that will bear fruit, not only in the work that they may do in any formal fashion in relation to RAND, but also in interesting other persons, and perhaps in their own thinking and work undertaken in a purely private capacity.

Benedict: I would like to return to what our chairman said in his speech at the beginning of the first plenary session, when he said he believed that it was obviously impossible to expect the military to plan for anything but war, but that we as social scientists had some obligations to put some emphasis on the possibility of avoiding war. It was a part of the list of topics on prevention of war, which means the arriving at a *modus vivendi* for saving western civilization, as I would call it, which would include United States and Russia. Perhaps because it is ten times as easy to do the one as the other, there has been a certain disproportionate emphasis upon military preparedness and actions in the case of war. I would like to suggest that there should be certain priorities given to those topics that fall under the heading of attempts to find a *modus vivendi*, if, as our chairman said, there is this opportunity in the social sciences of speaking to those who naturally do prepare for war.

Weaver: This is a very important phase of the general problem of which Ogburn has been speaking many times, of preparing for -- I dislike using this phrase, "preparing for war and not war" in a democracy. I not only feel strongly that what Mrs. Benedict has just said is true, but in addition to that, there is an obligation of the general citizenship of the country to be concerned even about some of those preparations which specifically are for war, but to keep a certain amount of that preparation in the hands of the citizens rather than in the hands of the military. It just seems to me a foregone conclusion that if you strap too good a gun on a chap's hip, eventually he starts to shoot; it is a little hard to keep him from shooting if you give him too good a gun. I am just so pessimistic that I think we have to have a pretty good gun, but I think that the design of it and a good deal of the control of it, should be the moral responsibility of the citizens of the country and not wholly a responsibility of professional soldiers. I have a great respect for professional soldiers. I did not use to have one, perhaps because I was chiefly a private and a second lieutenant in the first war; but I have a great respect for professional soldiers at the present time. I have worked very intimately with them over the last five or six years and they are intelligent and patriotic and sincere gentlemen; but I just don't think that you can expect anybody to go on being interested all of the time in something without getting interested in it. That seems to me a foregone conclusion, and just for that reason there is a very great moral responsibility, which so far I don't think the general citizenry has quite recognized.

Ogburn: The members of the staff of RAND have spoken once or twice of RAND's making friends among the social scientists and what we might do for the RAND Project. I thought of looking at it in the reverse, namely of what RAND might do for social science in its social setting in this postwar period. The close of a great world war like we have had tends to produce a set of changes that may be looked at as something like a revolution. We have had, coincident with the close of this upheaval, the introduction of certain discoveries, particularly in the field of nuclear fission, that are undoubtedly startling in their implications for the social order. I am inclined to look at the post war era as something new and challenging to the

Ogburn: social sciences. We have a number of agencies that operate in this field -- the Social Science Research Council, for instance, the National Bureau of Economic Research, Brookings Institution -- and no doubt these institutions will do what they can toward meeting these new issues and these new changed conditions. But I dare say, there will also be a certain tradition which will govern them. I dare say the National Bureau of Economic Research will continue its studies on income, for instance. But the impetus which these events have given to research is strikingly indicated by the movement to inaugurate a Science Foundation; we have heard stories of how much the budget for research has been increased in Russia; and surely a National Science Foundation would be a big event for American research. I take the point of view that every discovery in the field of applied science creates a problem of adjustment for the social sciences. I would even state it this way, every invention creates a lot of social problems -- they can eventually be solved, but they are created. The creation of a National Foundation may disperse funds to the extent of perhaps $75,000,000 a year, which will make discoveries and inventions that will have these repercussions on social science. The whole setting seems to me to be right for the getting together of social scientists to meet the new age characterized by these new technologies and these revolutionary trends introduced by the war. I am inclined to look at the RAND effort in holding this Conference as perhaps a beginning, which will give a fresh impetus to the social sciences to tackle this new age and these new problems which are crowding on us, and which, if we don't tackle them, will be disastrous. That is the sort of picture of the social setting, as I see it, that is back of this Conference, that might be thought of as a springboard to push us on to looking forward to the future.

Speier: I have observed throughout the Conference in various discussions that RAND has developed in some respects a lingo of its own. This is a question of RAND semantics. Certain words have been used in this Conference which I have been accustomed to use in a slightly different way: for example, the word "weapon", used with regard to activities in times of peace; and the word "peacefare", derived obviously from the word "warfare." I detect a real danger in the use of such words, not only because there may be a tendency, as the activities of RAND become better known among social scientists, to identify RAND as a project which even investigates peace in terms of war, but also because it may have real dangers for the social scientist who makes investigations, because words have a curious force. These words may be interpreted to reflect an attitude that is not appropriate. I seriously believe that it is preferable to speak of "instruments," of "tools", of "means", where in many cases in this Conference the talk has been about "weapons". It might be worthwhile to consider the public relations aspects of this remark, as well as the deeper implications.

Weaver: You have convinced me that an error in judgment was made with respect to certain ideas of terminology. Most of those to which you refer arose in connection with broadening the ideas of the military people, who initially had a narrower concept. To them you could start to talk about weapons, and little by little you could let them see that you meant "weapons" in a very broad sense, that you meant "target" in a very broad sense; in fact, eventually we confessed to them that we meant "target" in so broad a sense that it was equivalent to the word "objective" and that "weapon" only meant a mode of reaching your objective. In the same way, I think this phrase "peacefare" in its association with "warfare" came in. Another example of that same generalization which is perhaps natural to the mathematician, is to talk to the

Weaver: military about winning wars in all possible lengths of time, including winning wars in zero time, and when you win a war in zero time, that means that you have achieved the problem of preventing its occurrence. All of this was terminology which may perhaps have had some value with respect to the military, but I think it was a mistake to use it here, and I think you point out a very important danger in the use of that terminology.

Viner: I would like to bring to the attention of the Conference a neglected discipline whose possibility of contributing I should like you to give serious consideration to, and that is the historians. The right historians (don't ask me to name them) could have contributed much to this Conference, and I hope you will give thought later on to the possibility that they may be able to fit in.

Williams: Not until the closing hour have we heard a mention of the point Lasswell made to the effect that we had not considered the case of what happens if we lose a war. While that probably reflects our optimism and general determination, as a people who want to live a rational life and plan ahead a little into the future perhaps we should give a little serious thought to how we plan for peace and how we plan for war so as to minimize, or take into account the possibility of minimizing our losses if we lose.

Weaver: Indeed, I suppose there is a sector of the population at the moment who would pessimistically remark that the way to minimize your losses is to lose.

Viner: Of course, if we lost a war we wouldn't really have much choice, would we?

Weaver: Well, you obviously have a different set of choices and a more restricted set of choices, but you still have choices. My impression is that there wasn't even much interest in the problem of what we do with a victory. That seems to me a rather disturbing remark.

PROJECT OUTLINES

COMMITTEE I

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

W.F. Ogburn (Chairman)

R. Benedict	E. Kris	H. Speier
B. Berelson	H.D. Lasswell	S. Stouffer
H. Goldhamer	D. Marquis	S.S. Wilks
P. Herring	F. Mosteller	D. Young
C.L. Hull	E. Shaw	

PANEL I

AGGRESSION AND MORALE

H. Goldhamer (Chairman)

R. Benedict	H.D. Lasswell
P. Herring	D. Marquis
C.L. Hull	F. Mosteller
E. Kris	

Project No.1:1 Committee No. I Panel No. 1

Title: PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTACK BEHAVIOR

Description:

To what extent and with what ease can animals be taught to attack at command? What are the effects of restraint on the attack tendency, in particular if the quarry is unresisting and is prevented from escaping? How does the intensity of the attack tendency depend on pain, fear, hunger, sex frustration, and competition? How does the attack tendency decrease or increase as a function of punishment applied during the learning period, or of punishment applied after attack, or of the realization that punishment is being applied to the victim?

Research Method:

In addition to a variety of animal subjects, human subjects should be used whenever possible. (Specific experimental research proposals elaborating these ideas are already available.)

Utility of Results:

Light on the primitive tendencies of men to fight and the modifications of such tendencies under special training.

Project No. 1:2a | Committee No. I | Panel No. 1

Title: PUBLIC APPREHENSION OF THREATS TO PHYSICAL SECURITY

Description:

The aim of this study is to measure periodically the level of public apprehension about physical security. The nation-wide study should permit measurement of different sectors of the population.

Research Method:

Regular nation-wide survey organizations may be used. The technique of questioning should be sufficiently simple to permit insertion of relevant questions in the ordinary surveys of the polling organization.

Utility of Results:

Such a continuing index could serve as a basis for morale measures, as a means of measuring possible propaganda effects as warning of a state of "nerves" which might welcome war as a means of resolving tension.

Time Required: Continuing study.

Manpower Required:

The periodic services of a national polling agency. One analyst provided by RAND for planning studies, cooperating with agency and interpreting results; one assistant.

Money Required: About $20,000 for first year; probably less subsequently.

Who Can Do It: National Opinion Research Center.

Project No. 1:2b | Committee I | Panel No. 1

Title: CRISIS AND DISASTER SITUATIONS

Description:

There are contingencies, involving the physical and mental security of the American people, proper handling of which require more information. These range from large-scale physical destruction to demoralizing rumors. The study of the social and psychological phenomena involved is difficult to undertake experimentally, or from casual records. When such events occur, they do so unexpectedly and excellent research situations (e.g., Texas City) are lost because of the lack of research planning.

Project No. 1:2b *(Cont'd)*

Research Method:

Devise schemes for obtaining and analyzing data, suited to various kinds of crisis and disaster situations. Appoint teams of observers who would be prepared to go to the relevant places in their areas as soon as news of a crisis situation appeared - persons free to act on their own initiative, or on receipt of wired "go-ahead" instructions. Teams should be composed of social scientists, engineers, medical personnel.

Utility of Results:

Create knowledge useful in coping with crisis and disaster situations. E.g., types of facilities required, types of persons best relied upon for leadership, and effect of different counter-panic measures. Some information might also have offensive implications.

Time Required: Continuing study.

Manpower Required:

Probably 8-10 teams of 4-6 persons each; these teams might further enlist the services of college students as assistants.

Money Required:

Who Can Do It: Social Science Research Council and/or RAND.

Project No. 1:2c Committee No. I Panel No. 1

Title: MORALE POLICY IN WARTIME

Description:

Appraisals of German, British, and Japanese experience regarding development of morale during last war and measures to control and improve it; mass response to disruption of communication and transportation, to rumors of deprivation, to severe deprivations (from hurricanes, floods, etc.); evaluation of existing knowledge on panic and its control; recommendations on experimental studies useful for determining mass response to terror.

Research Method:

Analyze morale data secured by Office of Strategic Services, as well as other sources.

Utility of Results:

Provide guides for improving U.S. morale and disrupting enemy morale.

Project No. 1:2d | Committee No. I | Panel No. 1

Title: STRUCTURE OF TOTALITARIAN MORALE

Description:

Study of the extent to which Russian morale is determined by the ruling party, or by individual and group attitudes, and analysis of the effect on the power of the ruling party of air warfare which destroys or impairs normal administrative services.

Research Method:

Analysis and extension of sociological parts of U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.

Utility of Results:

Improvement of morale policies, which are at present based only on experiences with liberal-democratic countries.

Project No. 1:2e | Committee No. I | Panel No. 1

Title: EMOTIONAL IMPACT OF ATOMIC BOMBING

Description:

The attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki may have left "psychic scars". The problem is to determine whether their populations show a differential nervous "sensitivity" when compared with groups in cities not attacked by A-bomb. The problem of degree of nervousness may depend on the situation: e.g., those that impose considerable strain on the individual; stimulations of a specifically American-associated character; those with A-bomb associations; etc.

Research Method:

Use of tension-producing tasks (e.g., mirror drawing tasks); subjecting them to startle stimuli; etc., -- and observing the degree of nervous "collapse" under such situations of strain.

Use of psycho-galvanic reflex (or other physiological) measures for neutral, American-associated and A-bomb-associated stimuli. Amytal interviews could also be used.

Utility of Results:

Knowledge about the A-bomb as a psychological weapon.

Project No. 1:3 Committee No. I Panel No. 1

Title: PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE

Description:

Assuming that it is technically and financially feasible to establish within the next ten years an artificial satellite circling the earth on an orbit of several hundred miles altitude and capable of observing and reporting activities within every square mile of the earth's surface, what would be the psychological and political implications at home and abroad of the employment of such a satellite for purposes of reconnaisance?

Research Method:

Solicitation of opinions from and deliberations by experts.

Utility of Results:

Accumulation of military intelligence, particularly with respect to clandestine production of atomic energy and other preparations for war.

PANEL II
ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS

F. Mosteller (Chairman)

R. Benedict
B. Berelson
H. Goldhamer
C.L. Hull
E. Kris
D. Marquis
S. Stouffer

Project No. 2:1, 4:1 Committee Nos. I, II Panel Nos. 2, 4

Title: *RESEARCH PLANNING AREA:* U.S. GOALS AND VALUES

Description:

Attempt a clear and coherent formulation of American goals and values as individuals and as a nation. 'Peace' is a negative concept indicating absence of violent conflict, but failing to characterize the content of the peaceful state of affairs, both for ourselves, and for other nations.

Research Method:

Committee of philosophers and social scientists to determine the regions in which such clarification is most needed, and to appraise lines of analysis most promising for further work.

Utility of Results:

Stimulation and guidance for selection of policy most in accord with the general character of American goals, rather than limited and partial objectives, and taking into account long-range trends as well as immediate consequences.

Project No. 2:1a Committee No. I Panel No. 2

Title: COORDINATION OF OPINION STUDIES IN THE U.S.

Description:

Development of methods for coordinating regular polls (Gallop, Roper, etc.)

Project No. 2:1a *(Cont'd)*

Description: *(cont'd)*

with needs of government agencies and research organizations.

Research Method:

Set up and administer a program of public opinion surveys, in cooperation with the commercial and other polling groups; evaluate requirements of government and research agencies in terms of available methods and facilities to be expanded where needed.

Utility of Results: More adequate intelligence.

Project No. 2:1b Committee No. I Panel No. 2

Title: PRO-RUSSIAN FEELING IN U.S.

Description:

To determine, by use of subtle and indirect questions in public opinion surveys, the extent of the "highly" pro-Russian segment of the population, and of its proselyting activities.

Research Method:

Carried out in cooperation with the FBI; public opinion surveys at regular intervals to study variations in the magnitude of the group in relation to current events.

Utility of Results:

Useful in connection with the general problem of internal security.

Project No. 2:2 Committee No. I Panel No. 2

Title: RESEARCH PLANNING AREA: EFFECT ON FOREIGN ATTITUDES OF U.S. ACTS AND PRONOUNCEMENTS

Description:

Organization of research for determining the effect of U.S. policy, actions, and statements on the attitudes of elite and mass groups in European countries, and the effectiveness of the available sources and media for influencing foreign attitudes.

Project No. 2:2 *(Cont'd)*

Research Method:

Application of public opinion research techniques, adapted to the requirements of foreign research.

Utility of Results:

Improved prediction and control of foreign attitudes toward U.S.

Time Required: Continuing study.

Manpower Required: Permanent organization for European public opinion research.

Who Can Do It:

There is a public opinion organization now in existence interested in international polling; or possibly it would be desirable to set up a special European division of NORC.

Project No. 2:2a Committee No. I Panel No. 2

Title: COORDINATION OF PUBLIC OPINION STUDIES IN WESTERN EUROPE

Description:

Opinion polling agencies regularly sample public opinion in several western European countries. Government and research agencies frequently desire to know public opinion on specific questions. RAND might serve to bring these two groups together efficiently.

Research Method:

Set up and administer a program of public opinion surveys in Western Europe. European polling agencies are affiliated with the American Institute of Public Opinion. The major function of RAND would be to evaluate the requirements of various government and research agencies in the light of what can be handled by the polling agencies.

Utility of Results: More adequate intelligence service.

Project No. 2:2b | Committee No. I | Panel No. 2

Title: INCREASING PRO-U.S. RUSSIAN ATTITUDES

Description:

What persons, groups and agencies in Russia are most favorably disposed and least favorably disposed toward U.S.? What are the most effective techniques of increasing the influence of those favorably disposed, of winning the favor of those now unfavorable?

Research Method:

Interview former residents and Americans who have traveled. Conduct sampling polls among ex-Russians and determine reactions as a function of group background. Ditto in various European countries to find differences between Communists and non-Communists.

Utility of Results:

Indication of U.S. propaganda line to be followed, tactics to employ in foreign relations, etc.

Time Required: 2 years.

Manpower Required: Large

Project No. 2:3 | Committee No. I | Panel No. 2

Title: *RESEARCH PLANNING AREA:* PUBLIC OPINION AND PROPAGANDA

Description:

Research aiming at the discovery of the influence of various factors -- such as home, school, church, news items, newspaper editorials, magazine articles, radio, motion pictures -- on public opinion. What parts are played by reason and the emotions in shaping public opinion? What are the relationships between the cultural background of a people and their mass response to various propaganda stimuli?

Research Method:

Study of past and present propaganda methods in this country and abroad and the resulting public action. Study of various public-opinion polls taken in this country. Possibly psychological generalizations drawn from studies of small laboratory groups set up to imitate large social structures.

Project No. 2:2b *(Cont'd)*

Utility of Results:

Discovery of effective methods of improving morale in this country, and of controlling public opinion in foreign countries.

Project No. 2:3a Committee No. I Panel No. 2

Title: PROPAGANDA IN EUROPE

Description:

Study of European propaganda machines about which we know little (i.e., except England and Germany): institutional arrangements, ownership and control (open or hidden) of the communication media; study of the techniques.

Research Method: Analysis of OWI and OSS data.

Utility of Results: Improvement of information and intelligence functions.

Project No. 2:3b Committee No. I Panel No. 2

Title: COUNTERACTING COMMUNIST AND FASCIST PROPAGANDA

Description:

Methods of counteracting communist or fascist propaganda at home and abroad. Is it wise to ban the Communist party? How can the totalitarian influence in labor, political, religious and other organizations be reduced? By what other means can political sabotage be prevented? How can totalitarian propaganda abroad be countered effectively?

Research Method:

Analysis of reactions to methods used in the past, both here and elsewhere. Possibly psychological generalizations drawn from studies of small laboratory groups set up to imitate larger social structures. Study of the techniques of competitive advertising.

Utility of Results:

Discovery of effective methods of counteracting totalitarian propaganda.

Project No. 2:4 Committee No. I Panel No. 2

Title: PSYCHOLOGY OF MILITARY OCCUPATION

Description:

Systematic survey and correlation study of intended effect, method employed, and actual effect of the psychological aspects of our occupation practices in Germany and Japan.

Research Method:

Survey of official documents, interviews with American occupation officials, opinion polls in occupied countries, experimental group studies among citizens of occupied countries; study of selected historical parallels.

Utility of Results:

Improvement of our present occupation practices, and guidance for possible future occupation strategy.

Project No. 2:5 Committee No. I Panel No. 2

Title: LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL CONCEPTS

Description:

Logical analysis of basic concepts involved in the formulation of research programs and research results bearing on national and international security - e.g., morale, loyalty, ideology, etc.

Research Method:

Analysis to be carried out by a logician assisted by a psychologist and a sociologist.

Utility of Results:

Unambiguous formulation of research tasks, and results, and recommendations for action. Disclosure of gaps and of unsuspected connections.

Time Required: 6 months.

Money Required: $12,000

PANEL III
POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

D. Young (Chairman)

R. Benedict	E. Shaw
H. Goldhamer	H. Speier
W.F. Ogburn	S.S. Wilks

Project No. 3:1 Committee No. I Panel No. 3

Title: PSYCHOLOGY OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Description:

Psychological analysis of reactions and behavior of the Russian elite regarding international relations; character study of Russian leaders and potential leaders; typical Russian reactions at international conferences to specific methods of approach; reactions by Russian leaders and press to speeches by U.S. leaders, press releases, and editorials (e.g., type of statements ignored, discussed, contradicted); changes over time of principles and responses of leaders.

Research Method:

Psychological and content analysis of international conference reports (official and press reports); interviews with U.S. government officials having negotiated with Russians or having been present at negotiations; interviews with Russian renegades.

Utility of Results:

Greater predictability of Russian conduct in international negotiations.

Time Required: 1 year.

Manpower Required: 10

Money Required: $100,000

Project No. 3:1a | Committee No. I | Panel No. 3

Title: CULTURAL BACKGROUNDS OF DECISION MAKING

Description:

A study of the cultural backgrounds of personal decision in selected European nations. The party system and other political forms may be related to techniques of arriving at decisions in the family, labor unions, church, business, and other groups. The attempt will be made to identify trends and differences in these situations for various nations.

Research Method:

Interview of nationals in this country to supplement present historical and political records and studies, observation of concentrated national groups in U.S., extraction of material from novels, etc., written in the respective nations, and analysis by political economists, historians, and cultural anthropologists.

Utility of Results:

Should throw light on specific differences in processes of negotiation and compromise, and give concrete meaning to international differences in crucial concepts like democracy, liberty, and civil rights.

Time Required: 1 year.

Money Required: $10,000

Project No. 3:1b | Committee No. I | Panel No. 3

Title: SOVIET SELECTION OF RUSSIAN FOLKLORE

Description:

Study of the themes of Russian folklore which have been either enlarged upon or rejected by the Soviets.

Research Method:

(1) Analysis of traditional Russian folklore themes to indicate attitudes of national pride, strength, acceptance of fate, protest, etc. Priority would be given to Great Russian folktales, with Ukranian, Bielorussian and Georgian tales to follow. Certain story types might be selected for intensive analysis.

(2) Interviews with pre-Soviet reared Russians to identify tales most often referred to in their generation; whether they were taught in the schools in their day; how incidents were used as comments on their contemporaries'

Project No. 3:1b *(Cont'd)*

Research Method: *(cont'd)*

behavior, etc.

(3) Analysis of Soviet published folklore, especially collections intended for schools, and tales appearing in widely distributed publications. Corresponding analysis of U.S. folklore and its correlation with attitudes of the current generation as a control.

Utility of Results:

To show in an exceptionally concrete form some of the national characteristics upon which present Russian authorities may rely and the changes they are attempting to make.

Project No. 3:1c Committee No. I Panel No. 3

Title: ELITE PSYCHOLOGY OF SURRENDER

Description:

What is the interrelation between hopelessness, face-saving (an "honorable" way out), and self-preservation when the elite is confronted with an untenable situation? How can the weight of such factors be controlled?

Research Method:

Comparative analysis of the Italian, German and Japanese surrenders; study of the role played by "unconditional surrender" as an irreducible requirement; study of precedents established by the Nuremburg trials.

Utility of Results:

Knowledge of the most efficient terms that can be presented to an opponent, and their timing.

Project No. 3:1d Committee No. I Panel No. 3

Title: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL FACTORS IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Description:

Considerations of (1) extent to which the policy is motivated by a drive to establish a world Communist hegemony, (2) extent to which the policy may be

Project No. 3:1d *(Cont'd)*

Description: *(cont'd)*

explained by natural desire for security, (3) extent to which domestic conditions affect the policy.

Research Method:

Chart changes in "party line" in other countries as a function of time and location of those countries. Compare present with pre-revolutionary Russian foreign policy. Compare present domestic situation in Russia with that in Germany and Japan before World War II.

Utility of Results:

Aid in understanding and dealing with Russia.

Project No. 3:2 Committee No. I Panel No. 3

Title: *RESEARCH PLANNING AREA:* PSYCHOLOGICAL PEACEFARE

Description:

Compilation, invention, and evaluation of methods of psychological peacefare -- e.g., cultural programs, exchange of scholars, teachers and students, radio and newspaper propaganda, content and timing of press releases, diplomatic maneuvers, etc.

Research Method:

Study of past use by ourselves and other nations and statistical analysis of data thus obtained; appraisal of research possibilities.

Utility of Results:

Guidance for the future conduct of psychological peacefare.

Project No. 3:2a Committee No. I Panel No. 1

Title: SOVIET DIPLOMATIC TECHNIQUES

Description:

Study of the methods, forms and language of negotiations on various levels of the diplomatic hierarchy: attention to protocol and its use; responses

Project No. 3:2a *(Cont'd)*

Description: *(cont'd)*

to criticism; frankness, aggressiveness, courtesy in relation to issue involved; use of surprise, dissimulation, delay; symbolic actions (e.g., walk-outs), use for diplomatic ends of nondiplomatic announcements (e.g., Pravda articles).

Research Method:

Use of available records; interviews of foreign service officers and of reporters. Study of international conferences, diplomatic behavior of Soviet missions, treatment of missions to USSR, etc.

Utility of Results: Improved effectiveness of U.S. diplomacy.

Project No. 3:2b Committee No. I Panel No. 3

Title: EFFECT OF POSITIVE AND PASSIVE BEHAVIOR ON U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Description:

Study of the consequences in international relations of decisive as against indecisive behavior by policy makers.

Research Method:

Study of State Department records, coordinated with general news sources; comparison of Russian reactions to Roosevelt vs. Truman, Byrnes vs. Marshall vs. MacArthur.

Utility of Results:

Guide to presentation of future U.S. decisions affecting Russia.

Time Required: 1 year.

Manpower Required: 2

Project No. 3:2c | Committee No. I | Panel No. 3

Title: U.S. AND RUSSIAN USAGE OF POLITICAL TERMS

Description:

Do such concepts as "cooperation", "agreement", "peace", "freedom" have the same meaning for the Russians as for us? Are the differences on the language level, or are there basic differences in the value systems of the two countries?

Research Method:

Behavioristic and content analysis of pronouncements, publications, and related acts.

Utility of Results: Guidance for psychological peacefare.

COMMITTEE II
POLITICAL STUDIES

H.D. Lasswell (Chairman)

A. Alchian	E. Kris
C.I. Barnard	D. Marquis
B. Berelson	F. Neumann
B. Brodie	H. Speier
W.T.R. Fox	S. Stouffer
P. Herring	J. Viner
A. Kaplan	D. Young

PANEL IV
ELITE-MASS RELATIONS

A. Kaplan (Chairman)

B. Berelson	D. Marquis
W.T.R. Fox	F. Neumann
P. Herring	S. Stouffer
H.D. Lasswell	J. Viner

Project No. 2:1, 4:1 Committee Nos. I, II Panel Nos. 2, 4

Title: *RESEARCH PLANNING AREA:* U.S. GOALS AND VALUES

Description:

Attempt a clear and coherent formulation of American goals and values as individuals and as a nation. 'Peace' is a negative concept indicating absence of violent conflict, but failing to characterize the content of the peaceful state of affairs, both for ourselves and for other nations.

Research Method:

Committee of philosphers and social scientists to determine the regions in which such clarification is most needed, and to appraise lines of analysis most promising for further work.

Utility of Results:

Stimulation and guidance for selection of policy most in accord with the general character of American goals, rather than limited and partial objectives, and taking into account long-range trends as well as immediate consequences.

Project No. 4:2 | Committee No. II | Panel No. 4

Title: RESEARCH PLANNING AREA: POLITICAL PEACEFARE

Description:

Compilation of methods of political peacefare, such as threats, appeasement, negotiation, bloodless competition, infiltration. Study of the application of such methods in the past by ourselves and other nations, and of the effect of such application.

Research Method:

Interviews with authorities on foreign politics; statistical analysis of data thus obtained; appraisal of research possibilities.

Utilization of Results:

Guidance for the future conduct of political peacefare.

Project No. 4:2a | Committee No. II | Panel No. 4

Title: ROLE OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

Description:

Study of socialist parties in key areas (France, Italy) from the standpoint of their ability to maintain their integrity as independent movements, or their surrendering, under specified conditions of social crisis, to communist pressure or to that of Christian Democrats.

Research Method:

Examination of historical and ideological roots of socialism and communism in the light of this specific problem; studies abroad, by first-hand observation and contact with informed participants; by cooperation with U.S. intelligence channels in Washington and abroad.

Utility of Results:

Guidance on whether the U.S. should support or oppose such parties.

Time Required: 2 years.

Manpower Required: 4-6 analysts; institutional support for field work.

Project No. 4:2b | Committee No. II | Panel No. 4

Title: EFFECT OF NATIONALIZATION ON POLICY

Description:

Study of the impact of nationalization on domestic and foreign policy. What new ruling classes have been created by nationalization in Europe? In what way is the social and political composition of the country affected? What is the influence on the foreign policy of the country?

Research Method: Case studies in the field.

Utility of Results:

Guidance of our foreign policy in countries which have undergone changes in nationalization, - or which have tendencies to do so.

Project No. 4:2c | Committee No. II | Panel No. 4

Title: DETERMINANTS OF THE "REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION"

Description:

Traditional Marxian theory specifies the "Revolutionary Situation" as the necessary antecedent to a Communist coup. What are the determinants of the Revolutionary Situation in the modern world of widespread Russian influence? What can be done in any given country to relieve these conditions?

Research Method:

Analysis of U.S. experience in South America, and of Communist policy in France and Italy.

Utility of Results: Guide to U.S. domestic and foreign policy.

Project No. 4:2d | Committee No. II | Panel No. 4

Title: CHANGES IN FOREIGN POLICY BY POLITICAL EVENTUALITIES

Description:

What changes in policy could be anticipated as a result of various occurrences, such as Stalin's death, establishment of a U.N. police force, etc?

Project No. 4:2d *(Cont'd)*

Research Method:

Prepare a list of most likely eventualities and study each separately. Consider changes to be expected in the country where the incident occurs and the reactions of other countries to those changes.

Utility of Results: Improved stability of foreign policy.

Time Required: For a trial analysis: 6 months.

Manpower Required: 2

Project No. 4:3 Committee No. II Panel No. 4

Title: RESEARCH PLANNING AREA: DEMOCRATIZATION OF DICTATORSHIPS BY PEACEFARE

Description:

Long-term study of the possibilities of eliminating totalitarianism and restoring civil liberties, in countries at present ruled by dictatorial cliques; with particular reference to Russia.

Research Method:

Interviews with and formation of a board of experts for the purpose of formulating a program of research.

Utility of Results: Reduction of the probability of war.

Project No. 4:3a Committee No. II Panel No. 4

Title: REACTIONS OF RULING GROUPS TO INTERNAL PRESSURES

Description:

Study should concentrate on Russia. Attempts by the regime to placate or obliterate internal elite or clique opposition. Effect of opposition on foreign policy and conduct of foreign affairs. Long-term stability of the present regime.

Project No. 4:3a *(Cont'd)*

Research Method:

Analysis of State Department reports by U.S. embassy in Russia; Russian newspapers; Nazi reactions to internal subversive groups; U.S. policy on U.S. Communist party.

Utility of Results:

Indication of effect of diversionary tactics before and during crises.

Project No. 4:3b Committee No. II Panel No. 4

Title: REACTIONS OF RULING GROUPS TO CHANGES IN NATIONAL POWER

Description:

Study of recent changes in power of Britain, Russia, and the U.S. How do power policies change with growth or loss of national power?

Research Method:

Analysis of Russian, British and U.S. newspapers and news magazines for official announcements and propaganda as a function of national fortunes. Elucidation of differences between states whose governments do and do not change leaders under stresses.

Utility of Results:

Means of estimating internal status from external symptoms.

Time Required: 1 year.

Manpower Required: 2

Project No. 4:4 Committee No. II Panel No. 4

Title: POLITICS OF MILITARY OCCUPATION

Description:

Systematic survey and correlation study of intended effect, method-employed, and actual effect of the political aspects of our occupation practices in Germany and Japan; relation to diplomatic maneuvers.

Project No. 4:4 *(Cont'd)*

Research Method:

Survey of official documents, interviews with American occupation officials and with political leaders of occupied countries, opinion polls in occupied countries, experimental group studies among citizens of occupied countries; study of historical parallels.

Utility of Results:

Improvement of our present occupation practices, and guidance for possible future occupation strategy.

Project No. 4:5 Committee No. II Panel No. 4

Title: LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE CONCEPTS

Description:

Logical analysis of basic concepts of political science involved in the formulation of research programs and research results bearing on national and international security, e.g., security, sovereignty, peacefare.

Research Method:

Initial analysis to be carried out by a logician assisted by a political scientist.

Utility of Results:

Unambiguous formulation of research tasks, and results, and recommendations for action. Disclosure of gaps and of unsuspected connections.

Time Required: 6 months.

Manpower Required: 2 men.

Money Required: $12,000

Project No. 4:6 Committee No. II Panel No. 4

Title: THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION AND INDUSTRIAL REDISTRIBUTION

Description:

Estimation of the political costs of different schemes of redistribution - "costs" to include all important political consequences (favorable and unfavorable, immediate and long-term, national and international) that the schemes involve.

Research Method:

Public opinion polling of attitudes toward schemes; expert opinion on international political repercussions.

Utility of Results:

This, in conjunction with parallel studies in other pertinent fields, would provide a basis for judging redistribution schemes.

PANEL V
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

H. Speier (Chairman)

A. Alchian	E. Kris
C.I. Barnard	H.D. Lasswell
B. Brodie	F. Neumann
W.T.R. Fox	D. Young
P. Herring	

Project No. 5:1 | Committee No. II | Panel No. 5

Title: CONTENT OF GENERAL U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Description:

A full statement of U.S. foreign policy, including explicit and implicit facets; and analysis of this for consistency and adequacy. (What we believe its content is, and what others believe it to be).

Research Method:

Compilation of items by political historians presented as a thoroughly cross-indexed dictionary.

Utility of Results: Appreciation of present framework.

Project No. 5:1a | Committee No. II | Panel No. 5

Title: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TRADITIONS

Description:

Many American foreign policy traditions -- no entangling alliances, no conscription, military action for retaliation only -- may be unsuited to the present two-power world. By what should they be replaced, and what would be the effect on international tensions?

Research Method:

Basic historico-political essay on each of the dogmas of foreign policy; specific statement of how well dogma fits the present situation; study of the trend in public opinion regarding dogma, to test the intensity of public resistance to a radical reorientation of policy if needed.

Utility of Results:

Better adaptation of foreign policy to current situation.

Project No. 5:1b | Committee No. II | Panel No. 5

Title: FOREIGN POLICY UNDER TWO-PARTY GOVERNMENT

Description:

Study of the adequacy and limits of the bi-party system for widely acceptable foreign policy; traditional commitments of the parties, the pressures on them, the relation between commitments of their national committees and the party membership and electorate.

Research Method:

Historical inquiry into U.S. foreign policy and the role of the parties; questionnaires and interviews with state and national committees of the parties; development of foreign policy resolutions at the forthcoming national conventions of the parties, and in the preconvention discussions.

Utility of Results:

Improved understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of our form of government.

Time Required: 1-2 years.

Manpower Required: 4-6 political analysts.

Project No. 5:1c | Committee No. II | Panel No. 5

Title: GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY

Description:

Determination of which methods were successful and which failed to improve friendly relations. Business men vs diplomats, industrial vs agricultural development, exploitation vs loans, etc; relation of success to level of international tension.

Research Method:

Interviews of South American and U.S. business men, politicians, diplomats. Public opinion polls in South America. Study of requests by South American countries for aid.

Utility of Results: Guidance for future policy.

Time Required: 2 years.

Manpower Required: 5.

Project No. 5:2 Committee No. II Panel No. 5

Title: U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Description:

Analysis of the critical problems in U.S.-Russian relations from 1918 to date. At what points have issues been clearly drawn? Under what circumstances can (or will) U.S. policies be supported by force?

Research Method:

Study of State Department records, interviews with State Department officials (past and present), particularly expert advisers present at Big Three (or Four) meetings, Council of Foreign ministers, etc. Study of world-wide correlated activities of Byrnes, Marshall, and Mac Arthur, and of Molotov and other Russians. Analysis of Russian political and military moves since V-E day, and of agreements reached such as that concerning the occupation zones in Germany.

Utility of Results:

Improved planning of U.S. foreign policy in terms of ability to enforce policies short of using force.

Time Required: 1 year.

Manpower Required: 4 men.

Money Required: $40,000

Project No. 5:3 Committee No. II Panel No. 5

Title: INTERACTION OF FOREIGN POLICY WITH DOMESTIC POLICY -- RUSSIA, U.S. AND ENGLAND

Description:

What is the relationship in each country of its foreign and its domestic policy--i.e., to what degree does one motivate or influence the other? How is this effect exercised: What are the patterns of liaison between foreign and domestic agencies and personnel?

Research Method:

Analysis of empirical correlations between foreign policy changes and changes in domestic situations.

Project No. 5:3 *(Cont'd)*

Utility of Results:

Prediction of foreign relations from internal occurrences, and inference of internal conditions from foreign policy changes.

Time Required: 6 months.

Manpower Required: 1 man.

Project No. 5:4 Committee No. II Panel No. 5

Title: INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Description:

Studies of the utility, feasibility and stability of the possible forms of international organization among sovereign states.

Research Method:

Analysis by social scientists and historians, plus the solicitation of expert opinions from practicing diplomats.

Utility of Results:

To offer criteria for determining which forms of international organization, among the alternatives available today and probable in the near future, offer the highest advantages to the security of the United States and its goal-values, and the preservation of peace.

Project No. 5:4a Committee No. II Panel No. 5

Title: PRESSURES CREATED BY "POWER VACUUMS"

Description:

Analysis of those "power vacuums" which have most critically affected relations between the great powers, and the probable importance and location of "power vacuums" which can be expected to influence great-power relations in the near future--with emphasis on "power vacuums" in U.S.-Russian relations.

Research Method: Program of research to be developed.

Project No. 5:4a *(Cont'd)*

Utility of Results:

Prediction of actions which may result from future "power vacuums."

Project No. 5:4b | Committee No. II | Panel No. 5

Title: TROUBLE SPOTS AND INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS

Description:

The role of trouble spots, beyond the boundaries of national sovereignty, which lead to increased international tensions.

Research Method:

Individual projects providing continuing analysis by areas and by particular problems within areas of trouble spots and minority pressures; utilization of intelligence to which government agencies have access; where possible, field surveys in countries being studied.

Utility of Results:

Indication of criteria to be used in evaluating danger points, as an aid to the administration of foreign policy.

COMMITTEE III
ECONOMIC STUDIES

J. Viner (Chairman)

A. Alchian	C.J. Hitch
C.I. Barnard	F. Lorimer
B. Brodie	F. Neumann
A.J. Coale	W.F. Ogburn
C. Dollard	L. Ridenour
W.T.R. Fox	E. Shaw
H.M. Gray	A. Wallis

PANEL VI
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

L. Ridenour (Chairman)

B. Brodie	F. Neumann
A.J. Coale	E. Shaw
W.T.R. Fox	H. Speier
C.J. Hitch	J. Viner
F. Lorimer	A. Wallis

Project No. 6:1 Committee No. III Panel No. 6

Title: ECONOMICS OF MARSHALL PLAN (EUROPE)

Description:

Determine and appraise the postulates on which it rests, so that the aid requested by other countries can be viewed in proper perspective.

Research Method:

Use of economic theory and experience, in framework of U.S. goals.

Utility of Results: Provide basis for consistent action.

Project No. 6:1a | Committee No. III | Panel No. 6

Title: INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION

Description:

How should trade between a free-market individual-enterprise system and a state-controlled economy be effected? What is the importance of this problem for the revival of large scale international trade?

Utility of Results:

To aid in the formulation of a consistent U.S. policy, facilitating international trade.

Project No. 6:1b | Committee No. III | Panel No. 6

Title: U.S. TARIFF POLICY

Description:

The effects of U.S. tariff structure on the economies of other countries may create tensions predisposing to war. The effects on each country could be studied to determine whether it tends to drive them into blocs not friendly to the U.S.

Utility of Results:

Influence of group interests may be countered with foreign-policy considerations.

Project No. 6:1c | Committee No. III | Panel No. 6

Title: INDUSTRIALIZATION OF UNDEVELOPED COUNTRIES TO PREVENT WAR

Description:

Will international friction be mitigated by reducing the extreme disparity between advanced industrial nations and those less fully industrialized? How can the rivalry of the more advanced industrial nations for control and access to the less developed countries be reduced or controlled? Determine national industrial potentials in terms of modern techniques and estimate actual productivity; explore methods of raising the actual toward the potential.

Project No. 6:1c *(Cont'd)*

Research Method:

A quantitative economic study by nations or regions.

Utility of Results:

Provide a measure of the magnitude of the task of equalizing industrialization.

Project No. 6:1d | Committee No. III | Panel No. 6

Title: THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ON THE NATURE OF FOREIGN POLICY, AND ON ITS EFFECTIVENESS

Description:

To what extent do economic conditions (e.g., class structure; prosperity or depression; high versus low income standards; rising versus falling standards relative to other countries; industrial versus agrarian; heavy foreign-trading versus autarkic;) affect our foreign policy and its effectiveness (e.g., its determinants of whether foreign policy is aggressive, vigorously defensive, or submissive in character, and as to whether it is effective in obtaining its objectives; the role of prestige in foreign policy and its dependence on economic strength).

Project No. 6:2 | Committee No. III | Panel No. 6

Title: *RESEARCH PLANNING AREA:* ECONOMIC MOTIVATIONS TO WAR

Description:

Evaluation of the premise that war is a result of economic motivations; attempt to specify what the particular forces are, and to determine whether they are precipitating, facilitating, or generating causes. Part of general study on war motivations.

Utility of Results:

Provide a basis for evaluating lines of economic action designed to promote peace.

Project No. 6:3 Committee No. III Panel No. 6

Title: BELLIGERENCY INDEX

Description:

Construction of a high-sensitivity index from economic, political, and military variables for clues to the imminence of aggressive military action by the potential enemy.

Research Method:

Search for data on imports, military budgets, financial transactions, shifts of population, propaganda policy, etc., that will reveal the final stages of mobilization.

Utility of Results:

To obtain the earliest possible warning against attack.

Project No. 6:4 Committee No. III Panel No. 6

Title: *RESEARCH PLANNING AREA:* INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS BETWEEN SOCIALISM AND PRIVATE CAPITALISM

Description:

Is peaceful coexistence of two such economies impossible or difficult? What are the dominant frictional factors in their economic relations?

Utility of Results:

Study would provide better basis for evaluating our foreign policy toward various types of economies, and contribute to understanding of price of peace.

Project No. 6:4a Committee No. III Panel No. 6

Title: ECONOMIC PROSPECTUS FOR RUSSIA

Description:

Provide a basis for forecasting Russia's national income, industrialization, and population growth for various time intervals.

Project No. 6:4a *(Cont'd)*

Research Method:

Survey data on Russian national income, analyze Russia's five-year plans and the rate of accomplishment, coordinate available data into national income calculations, extrapolate on the basis of data that are expected to be continuously available.

Utility of Results:

Provide a rough estimate of the economic power with which we may have to contend.

Project No. 6:4b Committee No. III Panel No. 6

Title: ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES AND CONSEQUENCES OF RUSSIAN POLICY

Description:

To what extent has Russia extended its political influence for the purpose of controlling economic resources; and has this importantly affected Russia's economy? Are economic motives sufficient alone to induce political penetration in areas still outside the Russian sphere?

Research Method:

Gathering and analysis of data on the integration of Hungary, Poland, and Southeastern Europe generally. Continued check on economic developments within subsidiary countries. Interviews with Russian renegades.

Utility of Results:

Guidance as to the importance of economic concessions as a means of pacification. Discovery of Russia's critical shortages, and of the trend of its economic planning. Suggestions for countering expansion.

Project No. 6:4c Committee No. III Panel No. 6

Title: OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN TRADE OF RUSSIA

Description:

The internal activity and difficulties of Russia might be discerned from a careful analysis of her imports and exports, the rate at which various ports

Project No. 6:4c *(Cont'd)*

Description: *(cont'd)*

are used, and the sources of her imports. This information when collated and analysed in the light of industrial requirements and military requirements may provide clues as to types of Russian activity and research and industrial developments.

Research Method:

This project might be combined with the general study of the Russian economy and the belligerency index study.

Utility of Results: See Description, above.

PANEL VII

INTERNAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

J. Viner (Chairman)

A. Alchian	F. Lorimer
C.I. Barnard	W.F. Ogburn
A.J. Coale	E. Shaw
H.M. Gray	A. Wallis
C.J. Hitch	

Project No. 7:1 Committee No. III Panel No. 7

Title: *RESEARCH PLANNING AREA:* ECONOMIC PEACEFARE

Description:

Compilation of methods of economic peacefare, such as trade pacts, import and export tariffs, import and export embargos, loans, investments, blockade and other means of economic coercion, importation of food, vitamins and medicines, etc.

Research Method:

Interviews with authorities on foreign politics; statistical analysis of data thus obtained; appraisal of research possibilities.

Utility of Results:

Guidance for the future conduct of economic peacefare.

Project No. 7:2 Committee No. III Panel No. 7

Title: POLITICAL ALLIANCES vs FORM OF ECONOMIC SYSTEMS

Description:

Does a country's transition to national control of industry imply a trend away from the U.S. and toward the Russian sphere of influence? If so, how does this economic effect compare in strength to the effect of geographical location?

Project No. 7:2 *(Cont'd)*

Research Method:

A case study is possible, say, for New Zealand. In what ways has the economic change-over colored New Zealand's foreign policy?

Utility of Results:

Guidance for U.S. policy on tendencies toward economic statism.

Project No. 7:3 Committee No. III Panel No. 7

Title: NATIONAL INCOME INEQUALITIES AND INTERNATIONAL FRICTION

Description:

Determine whether improverished nations are generally political sore spots. If they are, it strengthens the case for assisting at least those that are critical to us.

Research Method:

Broad survey of such nations and an intensive survey of obstacles to economic improvement in critical countries.

Utility of Results:

In so far as poverty contributes to aggression, any findings about its causes and its cures are a positive contribution to peacefare. The survey should indicate openings for investment of friendly capital.

Project No. 7:4 Committee No. III Panel No. 7

Title: LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC CONCEPTS

Description:

Logical analysis of such basic concepts of economics as are indispensable for the formulation of research programs and research results bearing on national and international security, - e.g., national income, inflation, full employment, economic motivation.

Research Method:

Initial analysis to be carried out by a logician assisted by an economist.

Project No. 7:4 *(Cont'd)*

Utility of Results:

Unambiguous formulation of research tasks and results, and recommendations for action. Disclosure of gaps and of unsuspected connections among several fields of research.

Time Required: 6 months.

Manpower Required: 2 men.

Money Required: $12,000.

Project No. 7:5 Committee No. III Panel No. 7

Title: WAR FINANCE CONSEQUENCES FOR POSTWAR PROBLEMS

Description:

Different methods of war finance lead to different degrees of inflation, actual and potential, and to various degrees of economic disruption. How can forecasts be made of where inflation will break loose, and how can it be countered?

Research Method:

Study of various new devices contrived in other countries for holding inflation in check without resort to rationing in one form or other.

Utility of Results:

Postwar economic problems may be reduced and economic revival speeded.

Project No. 7:6 Committee No. III Panel No. 7

Title: EVALUATION OF PRESENT STOCKPILING PROGRAM

Description:

Analytical review of present program to judge whether size and variety of resource stockpiles reflect future wartime needs; account being taken of the costs of creating and maintaining stockpiles versus the costs of guaranteeing accessibility to the sources during wartime.

Project No. 7:6 *(Cont'd)*

Research Method:

Critique of theory and method on which present program is based; independent estimates for several items, to serve as spot-checks.

Utility of Results:

Possibly improved application of the piling principle; recommendations to reduce weaknesses, or for development of new program (if either is needed). Systematic check-off and cross-check-off lists of requirements.

Time Required: 6 months.

Manpower Required: 5.

Money Required: $60,000.

Who Can Do It:

Group including 2 government representatives (e.g., National Resources Planning Board, Commerce).

Project No. 7:7 Committee No. III Panel No. 7

Title: IMPLICATIONS OF ATOMIC ENERGY ON PRESENT ENERGY SOURCES AND INDUSTRIAL POTENTIAL

Description:

The significance of the development of atomic energy for industrial purposes in raising the standard of living, changing the importance of present energy sources, altering the geographical distribution of industrial plants and increasing industrial potential.

Utility of Results:

Provide basis for evaluating decentralization schemes, methods of increasing industrial potential and providing conditions most favorable for early use of cheaper power sources.

PANEL VIII
ECONOMICS OF PREPAREDNESS AND WAR

A. Wallis (Chairman)

A. Alchian	F. Lorimer
A.J. Coale	W.F. Ogburn
C. Dollard	E. Shaw
H.M. Gray	J. Viner
C.J. Hitch	

Project No. 8:1 Committee No. III Panel No. 8

Title: *RESEARCH PLANNING AREA:* POPULATION AND INDUSTRIAL REDISTRIBUTION

Description:

Analysis of plans of redistribution in terms of invulnerability gains on the basis of hypotheses as to probable nature of attack, and of cost, including all important social consequences, favorable and unfavorable, immediate and long-term.

Research Method:

Committee of social scientists to appraise specific research proposals in the area -- e.g., special studies on particular cities and industries.

Utility of Results:

To provide a basis for evaluation of redistribution plans.

Project No. 8:1a Committee No. III Panel No. 8

Title: RELOCATION OF GOVERNMENT FINANCED ENTERPRISE

Description:

Study of the influence of government contracts on the relocation of industry. Evaluation of the effectiveness of technique in the light of the over-all utility of industrial relocation.

Project No. 8:1a *(Cont'd)*

Research Method:

Determine the prospective investment in key industries financed by the government. Consider the relative efficiency and vulnerability of alternative locations.

Utility of Results:

Provide an approach to the relocation problem with a minimum cost and disruption of private enterprise.

Project No. 8:1b Committee No. III Panel No. 8

Title: INFLUENCING DISPERSION OF NEW PRIVATE INVESTMENT

Description:

Where there is a near balance between the attractions of competing locations, slight government influence in favor of non-vulnerable locations may be effective. A study of alternative locations for critical industries and of ways for influencing location could yield early results in the campaign for relocation.

Research Method:

Determine prospective investment in key industries most responsive to governmental needs. Consider the relative efficiency and vulnerability of alternative locations as well as the ways open to government for influencing the final choice.

Utility of Results:

Promising approach to relocation problem with minimum research time.

Project No. 8:1c Committee No. III Panel No. 8

Title: STATE-MUNICIPAL MEASURES FOR RELOCATION PROBLEMS

Description:

State highway and tax programs, for example, on the degree of industrial and population dispersion. These programs are not coordinated nor are they all deliberately concerned with dispersion for the sake of invulnerability. Federal appeal and advice may succeed in guiding local measures affecting location. It is important to discover what local policy is in vulnerable areas and to recommend modifications of it.

Project No. 8:1c *(Cont'd)*

Research Method:

Determination of areas of maximum vulnerability; study of local policy in those areas; specification of desirable changes of policy and of the most effective mode of federal intervention.

Utility of Results:

Prevent an aggravation of mal-location and provide some improvement in location, quickly and cheaply.

Project No. 8:1d Committee No. III Panel No. 8

Title: WARTIME ALLOCATIONS OF PRODUCERS-GOODS

Description:

Several alternative methods have been employed for allocating producers goods and raw materials. Evaluate each of these methods in terms of general effectiveness and administrative feasibility. The compatibility of these alternatives with consumers goods allocation, war finance methods, etc., should be considered.

Research Method:

Contrast the effectiveness of rationing programs in Britain and the U.S. Examine evidence of the existence of black markets as one measure of the failure of the rationing system. Evaluate any evidence of public antagonism toward the rationing systems.

Utility of Results:

Provide data for establishment of effective rationing system for use when, and if, needed. Provide data useful in disrupting an enemy's rationing system.

Project No. 8:2 Committee No. III Panel No. 8

Title: ECONOMIC WEAPONS OF WARFARE

Description:

Blockade, blacklisting, pre-emptive buying and other techniques of economic

Project No. 8:2 *(Cont'd)*

Description: *(cont'd)*

warfare cannot be effective unless they are fitted precisely to the pattern of the enemy's economic activity. What techniques should be adopted in the event of a war with Russia.

Research Method:

Analysis of the pattern of Russian imports and of the fragmentary economic data issued by the Russians should indicate what she depends on from abroad. Preliminary investigation of channels through which in wartime Russia would try to obtain resources.

Utility of Results: Guidance for foreign economic policy.

Project No. 8:3 Committee No. III Panel No. 8

Title: ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF MILITARY POWER

Description:

Economically, war is a diversion of resources for destructive purposes; power in combat is limited by resources available for diversion. There is a need for a survey of uneconomic limitations, such as monopoly in use of patents or in capital investment; unwise policies of taxation; short-sighted measures of conservation, etc.

Research Method:

An investigation may be made of trends in the degree of monopoly and of means for combatting the trend. The means may include a revision of patent policy.

Utility of Results: Increasing military potential in war.

Project No. 8:4 Committee No. III Panel No. 8

Title: VULNERABILITY OF PARTICULAR RUSSIAN INDUSTRIES

Description:

In War II several incorrect hypotheses and decisions were used in selecting German and Japanese targets. Vulnerability of various industries in potential

Project No. 8:4 *(Cont'd)*

Description: *(cont'd)*

enemy countries should be studied to facilitate selection of targets in the light of expected and alternative types of warfare.

Research Method:

Application of U.S.S.B.S. conclusions to new selection of Russian targets.

Utility of Results:

Relative vulnerabilities and military worth can be estimated and offense improved. Will also contribute to our defensive arrangements.

Project No. 8:5 Committee No. III Panel No. 8

Title: WAR II MOBILIZATION PLANS AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS

Description:

Mobilization plans for the last war were drawn up prior to mobilization, but apparently were modified greatly at the time of mobilization. A study should be made of the original plans and the actual mobilization procedure to determine the reasons for the changes.

Research Method:

An analysis of the original war plans and the actual procedures to determine the defects in the plans, and how such defects could have been foreseen.

Utility of Results:

Plans for future mobilization can be made with a higher probability of being useable and more efficient.

Who Can Do It: Brookings Institute has been a joint worker in such a study.

Project No. 8:6 Committee No. III Panel No. 8

Title: BOTTLENECK EXISTENCE SURVEY

Description:

Strategic bombing surveys have indicated the illusory nature of certain

Project No. 8:6 *(Cont'd)*

Description: *(cont'd)*

bottlenecks. Sample studies intended to determine the speed with which alleged bottlenecks were overcome might be useful in evaluating the importance of high productivity in general as the best defense against specific shortages.

Research Method:

Analysis of U.S.S.B.S. results, and of the American Technical economy.

Utility of Results:

May provide basis for re-evaluation of the bottleneck theory of attack, and the hypothesis that a high productivity level in general is the best defense against specific shortages. May provide criterion for selecting enemy targets.

Project No. 8:7 Committee No. III Panel No. 8

Title: USE OF FREE MARKET SYSTEM FOR INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION FOR WAR

Description:

The free market system may be useable to greater extent than has been realized. A study to determine if there are any ways in which increases in output of needed goods could be obtained more readily from uncontrolled sectors.

Research Method:

Analysis of the control methods of World War II to detect alternative methods that might have been used via a free price economy, or free price sectors of the economy.

Utility of Results: Improve industrial mobilization.

Project No. 8:8 Committee No. III Panel No. 8

Title: EFFECT OF PROFIT LIMITATION ON WAR PRODUCTION

Description:

Was the limitation of profits on war contracts, as provided by the Renegotiation Act, detrimental to war production?

Project No. 8:8 *(Cont'd)*

Research Method:

To determine whether the economic motive to shift from war to civilian production was outweighed by patriotic and other non-economic motives, analyses can be made of case histories (e.g., records of the War Department Price Adjustment Board), supplemented by interviews with executives concerned.

Utility of Results:

Throw light on the operation of the economic motive in the complex of other motives. Critique of the operation of profit limitation during wartime, as a guide for future legislation.

Project No. 8:9 Committee No. III Panel No. 8

Title: WARTIME FINANCE AND PRODUCTION

Description:

Study of effects of alternative measures (of war finance and wage, price, and income control) on maximization of production.

Research Method:

Theoretical deduction of consequences of various sets of assumptions.

Utility of Results:

To assist in developing, in time of war, control measures involving a minimum of restraint on production.

COMMITTEE IV
INTELLIGENCE AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

W. Weaver (Chairman)

A. Alchian	A. Kaplan
B. Berelson	H.D. Lasswell
B. Brodie	F. Lorimer
C. Dollard	W.F. Ogburn
O. Helmer	L. Ridenour
L.J. Henderson, Jr.	H. Speier
C.J. Hitch	S.S. Wilks

PANEL IX
INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION

H.D. Lasswell (Chairman)

B. Berelson	A. Kaplan
B. Brodie	F. Lorimer
O. Helmer	L. Ridenour
L.J. Henderson, Jr.	

Project No. 9:1 Committee No. IV Panel No. 9

Title: *RESEARCH PLANNING AREA:* PROPAGANDA USES OF MILITARY INFORMATION

Description:

What is the influence of withholding or publishing or manufacturing information concerning a country's military potential and the existence of new weapons upon a potential enemy's belligerency, preparedness, and conduct of war?

Research Method:

A social science group should survey the problem in an effort to discover a promising approach.

Utility of Results:

Determination of future policy regarding the disclosure of military information. Contribution to maximizing weapon effectiveness for peacefare and warfare.

Project No. 9:1a | Committee No. IV | Panel No. 9

Title: METHODS FOR INFILTRATION OF INFORMATION INTO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Description:

Study of the most effective methods for introduction of information into a foreign country, taking into account the country into which the information is introduced, whether or not the information is military (in particular, officially secret), whether or not the information is correct. Apart from the obvious methods of communication, the use of counter-espionage and the application of indirect methods should be investigated: e.g., infiltration into an intermediate country from which the information may be passed on inadvertently to the country of destination.

Research Method:

Systematic study of the effectiveness of methods used in the past, by other countries as well as the U.S.

Utility of Results: They will aid in selecting methods for further use.

Project No. 9:2 | Committee No. IV | Panel No. 9

Title: *RESEARCH PLANNING AREA:* CONTENT ANALYSIS

Description:

Exploration of the contributions which content analysis can make toward the acquisition of political, economic and military intelligence, in particular, with regard to Russia. The study should cover press, radio, public speeches, movies, scientific and technical publications.

Research Method:

Survey of existent technique and contributions for appraisals of methodological and substantive research proposals.

Utility of Results:

Increment in political, economic and military intelligence.

Project No. 9:2a Committee No. IV Panel No. 9

Title: INTELLIGENCE VALUE OF CONTENT ANALYSIS OF ENEMY PROPAGANDA

Description:

Study of accuracy, and identification of most fruitful methods, of content analysis of enemy propaganda during World War II. Predictions on state of enemy morale; expectations of enemy leaders; enemy intentions; frictions among enemy elites; enemy response to our propaganda.

Research Method:

Data to be used: official reports of U.S. and British government agencies; non-governmental content analysis: enemy morale reports and propaganda directives; interviews with U.S. and British officials active in propaganda analysis during and after the war.

Utility of Results:

Specific recommendations regarding intelligence and predictive value of content analysis of enemy propaganda as influenced by: methods employed, according to purpose and medium; office organization and personnel qualifications.

Project No. 9:2b Committee No. IV Panel No. 9

Title: STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE BY REMOTE CORRELATIONS

Description:

Identification of difficult-to-conceal factors which are related to strategic events such as the imminence of war, atomic development, etc.

Research Method:

Review and analysis of historical incidents, and of the military and social technology of war.

Utility of Results:

Hints useful for detecting unfriendly plans, and for safeguarding friendly plans.

Project No. 9:2c | Committee No. IV | Panel No. 9

Title: INDIRECT SOURCES OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Description:

Indirect methods may be devised by social scientists to aid intelligence work, if they know the nature of the things it is desired to discover, what is so far known about them, and the operations and materials that would normally be involved in the "thing" to be discovered. The problem is to conceive consequences so remote that secrecy is not thought of, not feasible, or not complete. The possibilities rest on the highly interdependent character of most phases of life in modern societies, so that decisions and activities concealed at one point may manifest themselves elsewhere in ways that seem to be completely unrelated.

Research Method:

Analysis of possible procedures; development of tests situations by which their worth can be tested; survey of the fields of intelligence in which such procedures might be used.

Utility of Results: Will promote effectiveness of intelligence operations.

Manpower Required: 2-3 social scientists and 2-3 intelligence experts.

Project No. 9:2d | Committee No. IV | Panel No. 9

Title: INTERVIEWING AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON RUSSIA

Description:

Development of organization and methods for systematic interview of all persons coming from Russia. Persons engaged in different lines of inquiry in this country should be encouraged to submit questions on which information is desirable and which might be secured by the interviewing of travelers, dissidents and other emigres, Russian soldiers in Europe, and displaced persons of Russian origin.

Research Method:

Collection (and further development, if necessary) of techniques best suited to each type of potential informant--exploiting psychological knowledge particularly.

Utility of Results:

Provide information requested by agencies and research groups that can specify definite information problems that they wish to resolve.

Project No. 9:3 Committee No. IV Panel No. 9

Title: SOCIAL SCIENCE ASPECTS OF AN ACCURATE MAP

Description:

A major project being considered by several agencies is the construction of a large very accurate map of the world. This map would have overlays to show meteorological and geomorphological information and also political, economic, and ethnic information. The aim of the present project is to consider what information of a social science nature should be included in the larger project, and methods of obtaining such information when it is not readily available.

Research Method: Solicitation of expert opinion.

Time Required: 6 months.

PANEL X

MILITARY AFFAIRS

S.S. Wilks (Chairman)

A. Alchian	W.F. Ogburn
B. Brodie	L. Ridenour
C. Dollard	H. Speier
L.J. Henderson, Jr.	W. Weaver
C.J. Hitch	

Project No. 10:1 Committee No. IV Panel No. 10

Title: LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF MILITARY CONCEPTS

Description:

Logical analysis of basic concepts of military science involved in the formulation of research programs and research results bearing on national and international security, e.g., military worth, vulnerability.

Research Method:

Initial analysis to be carried out by a logician assisted by a military scientist.

Utility of Results:

Unambiguous formulation of research tasks, and results, and recommendations for action. Disclosure of gaps and of unsuspected connections.

Time Required: 6 months.

Manpower Required: 2 men.

Money Required: $12,000.

Project No. 10:1a Committee No. IV Panel No. 10

Title: MILITARY WORTH

Description:

Analysis leading to the definition of the concept of Military Worth, taking

Project No. 10:1a *(Cont'd)*

Description: *(cont'd)*

into account not only destruction of personnel and material, but all consequences bearing on goals to which the military action and the war as a whole are instrumental.

Research Method:

Logical analysis combined with study of measures employed in World War II by Air Forces and others.

Utility of Results: Implicit in description.

Project No. 10:1b Committee No. IV Panel No. 10

Title: PERFECT WEAPONS

Description:

To determine the requirements, from development and manufacture to delivery on target and its sequel, for the most desirable weapons for peacefare and warfare.

Research Method:

Study of the logical foundations of weapon requirements, with due regard to the ultimate aims of the operations in which they participate, by a social science team.

Utility of Results:

Provides a crude yardstick against which actual and planned weapons may be assessed.

Time Required: 6 months.

Manpower Required: 5 men.

Money Required: $25,000.

Who Can Do It: Gen. Maxwell, of A.F., and RAND can fill two posts.

Project No. 10:2 Committee No. IV Panel No. 10

Title: PEACEFARE USE OF MILITARY WEAPONS

Description:

Assess experience with such weapons as public display of power, publication of existence of new weapons, etc.

Research Method: Study of case histories (Bikini, etc).

Utility of Results:

Increase U.S. skill and effectiveness in achieving its aims by steps short of war.

Project No. 10:3 Committee No. IV Panel No. 10

Title: SELECTION OF INDIVIDUAL PERSONS AS TARGETS

Description:

Study of individual members of enemy elite, to determine whose elimination, in war, would be most likely to produce an early surrender, due to confusion caused by the absence of leadership and to internal strife among would-be leaders.

Research Method:

Character structure studies of elite individuals, and power distribution in the elite group.

Utility of Results: Possible reduction in the cost of war in men and money.

Project No. 10:4 Committee No. IV Panel No. 10

Title: EFFECTIVENESS OF A-BOMBS ON U.S. AND FOREIGN TARGETS

Description:

Study of whether the target structures are so different in the U.S. and Russia as to make a great difference in effectiveness: e.g., what is the bearing of the fact that a large part of the U.S. is on a seaboard and thus susceptible to underwater atomic attacks?

Project No. 10:4 *(Cont'd)*

Research Method:

Data acquired from previously used bombs may be used in conjunction with known U.S. and foreign targets.

Utility of Results:

A careful evaluation of the effectiveness of A-bombs on U.S. and foreign targets will avoid the error of using number of bombs as an index of military power.

Project No. 10:5 Committee No. IV Panel No. 10

Title: EFFICIENT MOBILIZATION OF MANPOWER

Description:

Analyze factors which delayed transfer of manpower from non-essential to critical uses in World War II. Was the deferment procedure adequate for most efficient utilization of trained personnel?

Research Method:

Pilot studies could be made of particular industries. Translation of British and German utilization schemes into U.S. terms.

Utility of Results:

Provide an understanding of the techniques of most efficient utilization -- which may be essential if the enemy has preponderance of gross population.

Project No. 10:5a Committee No. IV Panel No. 10

Title: GERMAN AND JAPANESE PREPARATIONS

Description:

Study of German and Japanese methods in preparing for war. What basic principles and specific techniques were employed in these countries in influencing public opinion? What was the effectiveness of these methods? How were civil institutions converted from a peacetime to a pre-war state? What foreign policies prevailed during the various stages of preparation?

Project No. 10:5a *(Cont'd)*

Research Method:

Study of German and Japanese official documents and newspaper files. Interrogation of German and Japanese authorities in the fields of political science, economics, sociology, psychology.

Utility of Results: Applications in peacefare and warfare.

Project No. 10:5b Committee No. IV Panel No. 10

Title: METHODS OF SELECTION FOR MILITARY SERVICE

Description:

Study of how the methods of the World War II selective service system can be improved so as to impair the country's long-range potential as little as possible. What is the best method of choosing the job within the armed forces to which a person should be assigned. Is it desirable, in order to make personnel classifications more effective, to transform the personnel classification sections of the armed forces into a fourth arm of equal standing with the remaining three?

Research Method:

A board of scientists and military experts to analyze past methods and make recommendations for changes and further research.

Utility of Results:

Improvement in selective service procedures and classification of personnel selected; reduction in effect of war on nation.

Project No. 10:5c Committee No. IV Panel No. 10

Title: ANALYSIS OF MILITARY MANPOWER NEEDS

Description:

What skills will be demanded of the manpower engaged directly in an atomic war? Will universal military training actually obstruct our preparation for war?

Project No. 10:5c *(Cont'd)*

Research Method:

Prognosis based on expert opinions of scientists and military experts --- perhaps using existing highly technical military units as reference points.

Utility of Results:

Indication of what universal military training would have to achieve so as not to obstruct preparation for war, or to be adequate for war.

Project No. 10:5d Committee No. IV Panel No. 10

Title: TRAINING OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Description:

Study of necessary and desirable training requirements. What common training, over what period, must be given to all military personnel to ensure adequate indoctrination and discipline? In addition, how many specialized positions should each individual be trained to fill? What degree of interchangeability should exist among military personnel?

Research Method:

Survey of past experiments and theory. Interviews with military and psychological experts. Opinion polls among veterans. Experimental group studies.

Utility of Results:

Improvement of military efficiency, conservation of manpower in peace and war.

Project No. 10:5e Committee No. IV Panel No. 10

Title: INFLUENCE OF TRAINING ON THE MORALE OF FIGHTING UNITS

Description:

Should small groups be trained together consistently in order to create strong group morale, or is this outbalanced by the fact that the group will then be more vulnerable to the impact of casualties? To what extent is the morale of a soldier influenced by his indoctrination as to the purposes and aims in an armed force?

Project No. 10:5e *(Cont'd)*

Research Method: Experimental group studies; expert and soldier opinions.

Utility of Results: Guidance for the training of military personnel.

Project No. 10:5f Committee No. IV Panel No. 10

Title: LEADERSHIP IN SMALL MILITARY GROUPS

Description:

How best to choose and train a leader for (or from) small groups (up to 10-12 individuals).

Research Method:

Group experimentation, using military personnel and realistic (or well-simulated synthetic) situations.

Utility of Results: To increase efficiency of military organizations.

Time Required: 24 months.

Manpower Required: 100 subjects; 3 researchers.

Money Required: $200,000.

Who Can Do It:

Any military organization in collaboration with Harvard's Department of Social Relations.

Project No. 10:6 Committee No. IV Panel No. 10

Title: SABOTAGE AGAINST U.S.

Description:

Probability and effectiveness of active, or violent, sabotage on an important scale. What kinds of sabotage would be most efficient? What timing would be effective? How can we guard against sabotage or minimize the effects?

Project No. 10:6 *(Cont'd)*

Research Method:

Study of anti-German sabotage by conquered countries during World War II. Also anti-German sabotage traceable to Russian activity.

Utility of Results: Preparation of countermeasures, in case of need.

Time Required: 1 year.

Manpower Required: 2.

Project No. 10:6a Committee No. IV Panel No. 10

Title: SABOTAGE AS COUNTERATTACK OR DIVERSION

Description:

Is Russian mass sufficiently antagonistic to elite to be susceptible or adaptable to campaign of sabotage? What types would be most effective? How should it be organized and directed?

Research Method:

Interviews of recent ex-Russians; Russian target analysis; studies of French and other underground movements; cooperation with Army and other intelligence agencies.

Utility of Results: Applications in both peacefare and warfare.

Time Required: 2 years or more.

Manpower Required: 10.

Project No. 10:7 Committee No. IV Panel No. 10

Title: ANALYSIS OF PAST WARS (END-POSITION)

Description:

To obtain in summary form, for wars of all types, a description of the salient conditions that obtained in both camps at the moment of termination of hostilities.

Project No. 10:7 *(Cont'd)*

Research Method: Library research by historians specializing in specific areas.

Utility of Results: An empirical guide to what wins wars.

Time Required: 12 months.

Manpower Required: 5 men.

Money Required: $25,000.

Project No. 10:8 Committee No. IV Panel No. 10

Title: *RESEARCH PLANNING AREA:* U.S.S.R. TARGET ANALYSIS

Description:

Analysis of Russian targets from the viewpoint of an over-all strategic campaign.

Research Method:

Analysis and possibly reinterpretation of World War II U.S. strategic bombing surveys. Consultation with military and economic experts.

Utility of Results: Guidance in the design of strategic campaigns.

Project No. 10:8a Committee No. IV Panel No. 10

Title: *RESEARCH PLANNING AREA:* U.S. TARGET ANALYSIS

Description:

Analysis of U.S. targets from the viewpoint of an over-all strategic campaign directed against this country.

Research Method:

Analysis and possibly reinterpretation of World War II U.S. strategic bombing surveys. Consultation with military and economic experts.

Utility of Results:

Guidance in the design of an effective system of defense against a strategic campaign.

COMMITTEE V

METHODS, ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING OF RESEARCH

F. Mosteller (Chairman)

C.I. Barnard	L.J. Henderson, Jr.	S. Stouffer
C. Dollard	C.L. Hull	W. Weaver
H. Goldhamer	A. Kaplan	S.S. Wilks
H.M. Gray	E. Kris	D. Young
O. Helmer	D. Marquis	

PANEL XI

RESEARCH METHODS

O. Helmer (Chairman)

B. Barnard	E. Kris
L.J. Henderson, Jr.	F. Mosteller
C.L. Hull	S. Stouffer
A. Kaplan	W. Weaver

Project No. 11:1 Committee No. V Panel No. 11

Title: COMPOSITION OF RESEARCH TEAMS

Description:

Study of composition which most favors achievement (in a given time, ultimately, etc.) taking into account: type of problem; number in team; skills; major personality characteristics.

Research Method:

Group experiments in problem solving, using college and graduate students as subjects.

Utility of Results: Guidance of research management in forming teams.

Time Required: 24 months.

Manpower Required: 100 subjects, 4 researchers.

Who Can Do It: Harvard Department of Social Relations.

Project No. 11:1a | Committee No. V | Panel No. 11

Title: TRAINING FOR COOPERATIVE RESEARCH

Description:

Study of whether and how the group method of attacking broad scientific problems may be furthered by changes in or additions to academic curricula.

Research Method:

Survey of existing data on scientific group activity, in an effort to ascertain training-connected effects which markedly influence the success of the work: e.g., N.D.R.C. groups, Manhattan District groups, University groups, Industrial-laboratory groups.

Utility of Results:

If the survey suggests that a quantity of usable material exists, it should result in detailed recommendations on how the material may be analyzed and implemented.

Time Required: 3 months.

Manpower Required: 4 researchers.

Money Required: $25,000.

Who Can Do It: Joint Committee from I.A.S., R.F., C.C., and S.S.R.C.

Project No. 11:2 | Committee No. V | Panel No. 11

Title: RELIABILITY OF PREDICTIVE ESTIMATIONS

Description:

Study of methods by which haphazard choice of experts and the intuitive weighting used to combine their estimations can be replaced by a systematic procedure.

Research Method:

Submit to a group of experts a series of questionnaires calling for a variety of forecasts in each of a number of suitably chosen topics. This experiment will yield an "expert rating" for each person regarding each topic. Proper statistical analysis will provide the optimum method of combining the forecasts of a set of experts into a single forecast on the basis of their "expert ratings."

Project No. 11:2 *(Cont'd)*

Utility of Results: Improve the reliability of expert predictions.

Time Required: One year.

Manpower Required:

Six research man months plus clerical help (not counting the expert subjects).

Money Required: $10,000.

Who Can Do It: RAND and Consultants, possibly N.O.R.C.

Project No. 11:3 Committee No. V Panel No. 11

Title: SURVEY OF A NEED FOR A READING MACHINE

Description:

Study of the utility of a machine capable of identifying quickly any symbol in the alphabet, and of assimilating new alphabets.

Research Method:

Survey of need for such a machine, ending with recommendation that development work be, or not be, initiated. (For orientation: first working model might required 24 months, 10-15 engineers, $100,000-200,000.)

Utility of Results:

Possibly useful (in conjunction with automatic computing machinery) in transcribing and/or in digesting extensive intelligence material; e.g., in content analysis, translation, etc.

Time Required: 2 months.

Manpower Required: 3 researchers.

Money Required: $10,000.

Who Can Do It:

Joint committee from Combined Intelligence Group, S.S.R.C., RAND.

Project No. 11:4 Committee No. V Panel No. 11

Title: EMPLOYMENT OF ELECTRONIC MACHINES IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

Description:

Systematic canvass of the possibilities of employing electronic machines, especially high-speed computing machines and so-called analogue devices, as an aid in social science research.

Research Method:

Round-table discussion of social scientists and electronic computing machine experts.

Utility of Results:

Speeding up of social science research, and possibility of conducting types of research not otherwise feasible.

Project No. 11:5 Committee No. V Panel No. 11

Title: ELICITATION OF IMAGINATIVE RESEARCH IDEAS

Description:

Study of the best methods of eliciting research ideas that are both imaginative and realistic. Just as the physical sciences have recently produced Buck Rogers ideas of realistic proportions (color television, exploitation of atomic energy, an artifical satellite at the price of a battleship, artificial rain), social scientists should not shrink from the realm of the fantastic in their search for feasible methods of preserving the peace.

Research Method: Solicitation of opinions from social scientists.

Utility of Results:

Stimulation of effective social science research pertinent to national and international security.

Project No. 11:6 Committee No. V Panel No. 11

Title: NEWSPAPER SEARCH FOR RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS

Description:

Systematic search of news items and editorials relating to national security and international relations for ideas suggestive of worthwhile social science.

Research Method:

Scanning of representative dailies (and possibly weekly publications).

Utility of Results:

Source of ideas for research projects.

Time Required: Permanent.

Manpower Required: 2 persons on part time.

Money Required: $2,000 a year.

Who Can Do It:

Graduate students with background in newspaper research and social science.

PANEL XII
ORGANIZATION AND UTILIZATION OF RESEARCH

W. Weaver (Chairman)

C. Dollard	D. Marquis
H. Goldhamer	F. Mosteller
H.M. Gray	S.S. Wilks
O. Helmer	D. Young
A. Kaplan	S. Stouffer

Project No. 12:1 Committee No. V Panel No. 12

Title: INTEGRATION OF RESEARCH ACTIVITIES

Description:

Determination of the most effective methods of establishing continuous scientific liaison and cooperation, particularly in fields pertaining to national and international security. This should include: (1) methods of surveying research conducted throughout the U.S. and allied countries, and accomplishments of such research, (2) methods of conveying to individuals information about research conducted elsewhere and establishing effective cooperation (e.g., by condensation, tabulation, summaries, conferences, correspondence).

Research Method:

Solicitation of opinions among research workers in various fields; study of the theory of such an organization and review of pertinent experience.

Utility of Results:

Stimulation of researchers by virtue of their being better informed, more often competitive, more aware of gaps and overlaps in the planning.

Project No. 12:1a Committee No. V Panel No. 12

Title: NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

Description:

Survey of opinions on the usefulness, functions, and organization of a national science foundation. In particular, if the creation of such an

Project No. 12:1a *(Cont'd)*

Description: *(cont'd)*

institution is desirable, should it be centralized; should it be a civil service organization; should it be responsible to the Secretary for Defense, directly to the President, or should it be completely autonomous; what provisions should be made for having its recommendations translated into national policy; should it conduct and facilitate research only or development also; to what extent and in what manner should it contribute to the training of scientific and highly specialized technical personnel?

Research Method:

Solicitation of opinions among experts, appointments of a board of experts for the purpose of writing a detailed recommendation.

Utility of Results:

Guidance for the enactment by Congress of suitable legislation aiming at the establishment of a national science foundation.

Project No. 12:1b Committee No. V Panel No. 12

Title: CONTROL OF SCIENTIFIC PERSONNEL RESOURCES

Description:

Study of what can be done to alleviate the present scarcity of competent scientific personnel. How much unnecessary duplication of research is there? How much manpower can be saved by proper coordination of research? What type of federal subsidies should be recommended to alleviate the situation? Should the training of scientific apprentices by the research organizations themselves be encouraged? If so, how? How can an effective national roster of scientific personnel be provided?

Research Method:

Solicitation of opinions, and formation of a board of experts for the purpose of writing a set of recommendations.

Utility of Results: Alleviation of the scarcity of scientific personnel.

Project No. 12:2 Committee No. V Panel No. 12

Title: TRANSLATION OF RAND RECOMMENDATIONS INTO NATIONAL POLICY

Description:

Study of most effective ways of presenting scientific conclusions and recommendations so that they will be appreciated by policy makers. Methods of reporting, psychological effects, degree of technical content, level at which information should be first presented, follow-up activities, frequency of recommendations.

Research Method:

Group experiments; study of sales methods in an elite market; case studies of recommendations; polling and interviews.

Utility of Results:

Heightened effectiveness of advisory function of RAND and other agencies.

Project No. 12:3 Committee No. V Panel No. 12

Title: SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF MATERIAL

Description:

A preliminary survey on developing a rational set of criteria for determining what information should be classified for security, and what degree of classification should be imposed, in terms of long-range national welfare.

Research Method:

Review and critique of present rules; analysis of the concept of classification; consideration of political, military, and social consequences of classification, especially of scientific information.

Utility of Results:

The survey may uncover in the present rules serious faults whose solutions are obvious once the faults are seen. It will lay the groundwork for a thorough government - military - social-science project designed to write a much more useful set of regulations.

Time Required: 5 months.

Manpower Required:

5 social scientists (at least one from jurisprudence); 3 logicians.

Project No. 12:3 *(Cont'd)*

Money Required: $40,000.

Who Can Do It:

S.S. team selected by S.S.R.C.-R.F.-C.C.; others selected by RAND.

Project No. 12:4 Committee No. V Panel No. 12

Title: PROJECT EVALUATION WITH RESPECT TO ALTERNATIVE TYPES OF WAR

Description:

Study of the various types of warfare and their relative likelihood. On the basis of this study, a procedure should be evolved of appraising research proposals and recommendations flowing from such research that are pertinent to defense and the conduct of war.

Research Method:

Military experts and others may be able to formulate various hypotheses as to types of warfare and give some degree of likelihood of each type as well as features of the various types.

Utility of Results:

Evaluation of types of research and of recommendations based on them.

Project No. 12 Committee No. V Panel No. 12

Title: ORGANIZATION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH UNDER RAND AUSPICES

Description:

Development of recommendations as to the best methods of conducting social science research under RAND auspices. Demarcation of the respective areas within which such research should best be conducted by RAND's home office staff, by university subcontractors, combination of several of these.

Research Method: Formation of an advisory committee.

Utility of Results:

Greater efficiency of social science research conducted under RAND auspices.